Briggs Bomba July 9, 2008
Foreign Policy In Focus
www.fpif.org
The world's attention has been riveted in 2008 by election crises in
Africa, first Kenya, and now Zimbabwe. In both cases, challenges
remain in converting electoral victory to political power. Can a
victorious opposition come to power in the face of an obstinate
incumbent? This question is particularly relevant when the incumbent
regime controls the coercive apparatus of the state and the opposition
only has the ballot in its corner. In the battle of the ballot vs. the
bullet, can there ever be a fair match?
Historically the answer has been no. But new developments on the
democratic front in Africa in the last decade have strengthened
election support and monitoring by key regional bodies, the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU). In
2004, SADC adopted "Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic
Elections" aimed at "enhancing the transparency and credibility of
elections and democratic governance as well as ensuring the acceptance
of election results by contesting parties."
The "African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance"adopted by
the AU in 2007 promised to, among other things, "promote the holding
of regular free and fair elections to institutionalize legitimate
authority of representative government as well as democratic change of
government." These developments have strengthened the electoral
process on the continent, creating the space for opposition parties to
compete fairly. At a minimum, international supervision through these
protocols compels sitting governments to desist from outright
repression and undemocratic practices.
Vibrant Civil Society
Another significant development on the African continent is the
emergence of a vibrant independent civil society focused on democracy,
human rights, and social justice. In fact, the SADC and AU protocols
would not count for much if not for civil society pressure on African
leaders to abide. In both the Zimbabwean and Kenyan election crises,
civil society played a key role in documenting, exposing, and
transmitting human rights violations. In addition, the advent of the
Internet and other modern communication tools shrinks time and space,
making it possible to build instant global people to people
communication and solidarity links. Consequently, incidents that would
blow away unnoticed in the past, now invoke global outrage.
Weak National Democratic Institutions
Both the cases of Kenya and Zimbabwe expose the weaknesses of national
democratic institutions, particularly those mandated to oversee the
conduct of elections. In Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission,
like its Kenyan counterpart was exposed as partisan in favor of the
incumbent regime. In both countries the judiciary offered no recourse
as the judicial bench is routinely "staffed" by government loyalists.
A key challenge therefore is how to evolve robust democratic
institutions as a lasting foundation for an enduring democracy and
social stability. Key elements of a fully functioning democracy are an
independent and impartial electoral commission, an independent
judiciary, and a democratic constitution. Regrettably, these
conditions don't always hold in countries emerging from a colonial
past.
Nonpartisan security forces are also critical elements of a democratic
state where people choose their leaders freely. In Zimbabwe the army,
the police, and secret services merged seamlessly with the violent
campaign machinery of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Unity
Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF). In Kenya, the police stood in President
Kibaki's corner and brutally massacred hundreds of opposition
activists in protests that followed the disputed election. The lessons
of Kenya and Zimbabwe underscore the importance of professionalizing
the army, police, prison services, and secret services so that the
security forces are not party operatives. This is particularly
daunting for countries like Zimbabwe, where former liberation
movements are in power and their allied armed wings have been
integrated into national security forces. There tends to be partisan
loyalty amongst these "war veterans," their allies, and affiliated
parties.
International Intervention
Both Zimbabwe and Kenya raise the question of the role of the
international community in resolving internal conflict. Clearly, in
circumstances of weak democratic institutions, a victorious opposition
must rely on more than the ballot to secure power. In the case of
Kenya, unlike Zimbabwe, the opposition used mass mobilization and
threats of total economic paralysis to leverage its power and
ultimately compel the sitting government towards a negotiated
settlement.
In Kenya, the United States, Britain, the AU, and other players in the
international community played a key role in brokering the
power-sharing deal that stopped Kenya from plunging into the abyss of
political chaos. While the political settlement in Kenya succeeded in
stopping violence, the key question remains unanswered — how to ensure
the unhindered transfer of power to the true winners of the election.
The deal currently holding Kenya together is an inferior solution that
will only be meaningful if immediate steps are taken to ensure that
the will of the people is respected in the next election.
International mediation in Kenya was made easier as key players in the
international community had access to and leverage with leaders from
both sides of the crisis; and the local actors were not irreparably
polarized. This is a key difference with Zimbabwe, where political
polarization is acute and Western powers have no diplomatic access to
Mugabe. Mugabe's response to Britain's "school yard" isolationist
diplomacy has been to throw his toys and act like he just does not
care.
The role that the United States can play in Zimbabwe is undermined by
the Bush administration's lack of international credibility, partly
because of the discredited Iraq war; and outright hypocrisy where the
United States embraces favored dictators such as Ethiopia's Meles
Zenawi and Pakistan's Musharraf while preaching democracy in Zimbabwe.
These discrepancies make statements about democracy in Zimbabwe ring
hollow and provoke questions about the real motives of U.S. foreign
policy.
SADC and the AU, equipped with relatively new principles and
protocols, are limited in their actions by the poor human rights
record and electoral practices of many of the present leaders. The
precedent already set by failure to take a firm stance against members
such as Sudan for gross human rights abuses and Ethiopia and Nigeria
for outright electoral fraud, limits the extent of what African
leaders can do now. Mugabe is already exploiting this Achilles' heel,
effectively paralyzing the AU by arguing that others have been allowed
to get away with worse crimes. Thus, while there is a growing voice of
"concern" by African leaders, the response falls far short of the
moral outrage conditions on the ground demand.
The 14-nation strong SADC is in the best position to influence
developments in Zimbabwe. The region completely landlocks Zimbabwe and
as such wields a big economic muscle. But more importantly, SADC does
have a history of direct intervention in trouble spots. In 1998 South
Africa and Botswana sent troops to Lesotho as part of a SADC mission
to crush a coup and "restore democracy" following controversial
elections in that country. In 1997, Mugabe, in a position then as
SADC's Chairman of the Organ on Security and Defense, led Angola and
Namibia in a military intervention in the Democratic Republic of
Congo.
The key question is how to balance intervention by all the
international players — SADC, AU, UN, and Western powers. The UN's
role is tough as its original mandate involved conflicts between and
not within nations. Western powers, particularly the United States and
Britain, have thrust themselves forward ahead of all the other players
in Zimbabwe in ways that are not always helpful given the region's
colonial past and Western corporate interests. Unilateral actions by
Western countries often compromise the position of democratic forces
on the continent, as they face accusations of being Western puppets.
African leaders in a new era of African renaissance do not want to
appear to be taking orders from the West. This is not to say that the
West has no role to play — international action must be directed
through existing African institutions and the UN.
In countries like Zimbabwe and Kenya, bolstering African institutions
and pressuring them to uphold their protocols on human rights,
elections and good governance is the best path to democracy. A true
solution to the current political crises in Zimbabwe and elsewhere on
the continent is strengthening the ballot, and amplifying regional and
continental peace making through the AU and SADC.
Foreign Policy In Focus contributor Briggs Bomba is Associate Director
for Campaigns at Africa Action. He is from Zimbabwe.
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