SOPRI
2nd Somaliland Convention
‘The Governance and Economic Development of Somaliland’
8- 10th September 2006
Washington D.C., USA

Thoughts on elections and post-elections:
a Somaliland/ UK civil society perspective.

Steve Kibble/Adan Yusuf Abokor
Progressio.
London/ Hargeisa.

31st August 2006
Contents:

Introduction …………………….. P3.

Events to the South …………….P4.

Paths to Democracy ……………P5

Parliamentary Elections ………..P5

Post-election Challenges ………P7

International Support and role ….P9

Conclusion ……………………….P10



Summary:
This paper examines the parliamentary election of 2005 and its aftermath from the perspective of civil society activists working in Somaliland and in international advocacy on Somaliland for Progressio (which has worked in the country for over a decade). It looks at the opportunities created by the path to democratisation in a society changing from a hybrid ‘traditional’ form towards a more formal Western-type democracy. Within the regional context of events in (South) Somalia, the paper calls for sensitive and collaborative outside interventions, and for the momentum to democratisation not to be derailed by external events. It makes some suggestions for the form such interventions might take.

Whilst we work for Progressio, this paper is a contribution to debate rather than a final position statement of our organisation.

Steve Kibble is also a spokesperson for Somaliland Focus (UK). Details of its work can be found at http://www.somalilandfocus.org/uk
Thoughts on elections and post-elections:
a Somaliland/ UK civil society perspective.
Steve Kibble/Adan Yusuf Abokor
Progressio[1].

‘Something is wrong. In Somalia you just need to kill 100 people to be recognised by the international community as a ‘player’. But you do not get any recognition if several thousand people vote for you here [in Somaliland] ‘ – 2005 election candidate interviewed by Mark Bradbury quoted in Abokor and Kibble (2006) Further Steps to Democracy: The Somaliland Parliamentary elections, September 2005. Progressio, London.

Introduction
This paper’s focus is the parliamentary elections of 2005 and an assessment of what progress has been made nearly a year later. This is against the background of how outside assistance (especially non governmental) has helped (or possibly hindered) Somaliland’s progress to democracy and reconstruction. It stresses that whilst the external environment is not helpful at the moment towards Somaliland (SL), both Somalilanders and outside friends inside and outside the diaspora need to keep the momentum towards democratisation. There is need for a sustained commitment and interventions by key actors who know each others functions, approaches, methods of assessing impact and the like. A multi-track approach to peace and stability in the wider Somali region is vital.

We enter a plea for a greater historical understanding since many outside interventions, colonial and post-colonial, have been based on misunderstandings of Somalia/land and Somali culture and ‘tradition’. Has Somaliland or the region yet completely come to terms with the way that a decentralised [for men] egalitarian clan-based system came into unequal contact with a modernist centralised colonial system? Three historical eras followed this collision – all marked by violence. We can see how the path to democratisation has attempted to reverse this process, whilst external factors reinforce it.

Somaliland might be said to be poised between ‘traditional’ structures arising from clan society and the ideas emanating from civil society (often influenced by time spent in the diaspora[2]) on more Western forms of democratisation. In terms of post-election assessment it is useful to ask who negotiates this exchange? It seems as though some key actors are beginning to move the hybrid form along to reflect more clearly the developing Somaliland – women’s groups, civil society[3], urban youth, some of the business sector. How the more traditional elements exemplified perhaps by the ruling party UDUB[4] and a number of clan leaders (and men in general?) react to such movement will reflect the Somaliland post-election path. However we should also be aware that this is unlikely to be a linear path or indeed take the form of binary opposition between ‘so-called progress’ and ‘tradition’. We are trying to avoid the trap here, common to much outside comment of an over-reliance on fairly simple opposites/ binaries such as clan v religion, moderate v fundamentalist, modern v traditionalist, monolithic Somali bloc versus monolithic Somaliland one, Islamists v warlords, Christian v Muslim and the like.

Somaliland’s declaration that its union with Somalia had finished given the lack of a viable state in the south occurred within the second wave of democratisation in the early 1990s; as Mark Bradbury has proposed, it arguably it had more success in legitimating the state in the eyes of its citizens at least because it was based on well understood and historically strong foundations that neither colonialism nor ‘scientific socialism’ were able to wipe out – in essence a social contract which regulates political and economic relationships between pastoral kinship groups rather than delegating responsibility to a central government. Somaliland’s recent history of conflict resolution has involved a bottom-up approach to building societies from local communities upwards, gradually widening the arena of political agreement and political consensus. According to Ioan Lewis, this method of widening political consensus works when societies are as in the Somali case, highly fragmented and decentralised, and do not conform to assumptions about the universality of civil society and Western multiparty democracy. How does outside assistance sensitively deal with such a (changing) process?

What are the current challenges facing Somaliland in terms of development and democracy?
Where are we nearly a year after the parliamentary elections?
Is there movement on greater representation for women?
In what particular areas are Somalilanders themselves looking for change (and outside assistance)?
What practical steps in democratisation can outsiders help with?
What are they already doing?
Are the key areas the effective role of political parties, human rights training, media freedom issues, equality of gender representation etc?

Events to the South
Regionally, we appear to be in a delicately balanced situation for Somaliland. Part of the ‘international community’ was seemingly about to line up behind the African Union (AU) as it looked at the case for recognition, but now the ‘Islamist threat’ threatens to put Somaliland on the back burner[5]. Equally Somali ‘radicals’ and ‘moderates’ alike reject either independence or federal solutions for Somaliland. Our concern is over how far a destabilising external context derails the democratisation process internally, with the danger of those in the SL state apparatus with a Siad Barre legacy lapsing into what they have known in the past of anti-democratic practices, executive diktat etc. There are also worries that Somaliland’s native extremists are getting stronger eg in Burco and that Islamist anti-foreigner rhetoric has resonance inside the country. Do Somalilanders including the young see the government doing enough for the country? There is need here to avoid an external and internal alliance of extreme political Islamists – in Somaliland as well as Somalia – by having a conversation with ‘moderate conservative’ Islamists who have similar views to the political Islamists but who are opposed to violence. It is unfortunate that whilst Somaliland’s people have been closely observing the situation (and are concerned about effects on Mogadishu’s civil society[6] and the position of women there) neither house of parliament has looked at either the events to the south or the effect on Ethiopian- Somaliland relations – leaving it to the opposition parties. However in terms of the wider regional context we leave it to other papers.

Paths to Democracy
The proclamation of independence in 1991 following the collapse of the unitary Somali state meant that the new Somaliland state had the opportunity to break with former corrupt, military and unrepresentative forms of government. The lack of formal international recognition for Somaliland has its costs. Without it the country does not qualify for bilateral donor assistance or the support of international financial institutions for reconstruction. Lack of recognition has discouraged foreign investments and constricts trading practices. The meagre international assistance received, however, has meant that reconstruction has been largely achieved from the resources and resourcefulness of Somalilanders themselves. The main source of finance has been remittances from the Somalis living abroad. Since 1998 these have replaced the income from livestock exports as the mainstay of the economy. Lack of recognition also meant that Somalilanders had the opportunity to build their own system tailored to their needs. For the first twelve years this was a hybrid system combining traditional institutions of clan governance (or male pastoral democracy) with formal Western-style government institutions.

The government has signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; overseen the restoration of peace; demobilised former combatants; brought about social and economic rehabilitation and overseen the drafting of a constitution based on universal suffrage, decentralisation and multi‑partyism. There is a war crimes commission looking into the human rights abuses of the Siad Barre years. There is a reasonably high level of personal security for citizens. However, apart from its economic viability, Somaliland’s prospects also depend on the viability of its current political order.

The recognition issue is a key litmus test for Somalilanders. In 1999, the then President Egal argued that democratisation would facilitate international recognition of Somaliland. In May 1999, the Hargeisa government approved a plan to move from the clan-based system to a multi-party political system –providing the proposed parties were not based on tribal or religious lines and drew support from all regions. There were to be votes for women, although no women were actually consulted in drawing up the draft. In 2001 a referendum on the new constitution was conducted in Somaliland. In Dec 2002 and April 2003, the local government district councils and the presidential elections were held respectively in a reasonably free and fair manner as commented on by international observers such as my own institute[7].

Parliamentary elections of 2005
In 2005 CIIR was officially requested by the National Electoral Commission (NEC) to invite and assemble the 76-strong international election observation (IEO) team for the September 2005 elections for the House of Representatives[8]. In addition to the IEOs selected from four continents, there were Somalilanders from the diaspora in the UK, Sweden and Canada, and expatriate staff of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs)[9]. After sending a preliminary assessment team to consult widely with local civil society, political parties, media, the NEC etc, CIIR fielded a team to observe the preparations for the poll, the parties’ campaigns, the aftermath of the poll, and to monitor media coverage. The elections were witnessed by a team of 76 observers from 19 countries - Kenya, Ethiopia, South Africa, Mozambique, the Philippines, Germany, France, Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria, Italy, Denmark, Spain, Finland, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

Since the European Commission (EC) could not provide funds directly to the NEC or government institutions, there was a need for an intermediary international organisation, able to submit a project proposal based on the “Somali Democracy Programme”, Phase One of which addressed the Somaliland parliamentary elections in Sept 2005. WSP matched the criteria as they have affiliates in Somalia/Somaliland such as the Academy of Peace & Development (APD). The WSP and the APD had management roles as well as financial responsibility.

A week prior to the poll, the peaceful election campaign was interrupted by a serious security incident in Hargeisa, involving a gun battle between police and a group of alleged militant jihadists linked to a Mogadishu Islamic radical groups. This appeared a double purpose attack; firstly to disrupt elections, and secondly, to free prisoners awaiting trial for the murders of foreigners in Somaliland. Several of those detained by police have since been convicted of the murders, and sentenced to death[10].

The elections themselves and the observation mission were not affected, and the IEOs went on to visit 361 polling stations around Somaliland on the polling day itself (over-one third of the total of 982 stations) and found the atmosphere highly positive. Election day saw a turnout of over 600,000 voters. The IEOs were able to conclude that despite many procedural problems as with the 2002 elections (lack of a census and registration process; breaking of the voluntary code of conduct by political parties; a lack of secrecy in some ballots; complicated ballot papers; attempts at multiple voting; and unequal representation of women) the elections were conducted in a ‘reasonably free and fair’ fashion.[11] Within days of the poll, but before the final results were confirmed, CIIR issued an interim report in October to this effect to the NEC. We noted in our final report that in contrast to neighbouring countries like Ethiopia, the elections were carried out peacefully - yet again. The diaspora played a visible role and contributed extensive experience of other democratisation processes. The parties, although combative and unequally privileged, were disciplined. We made recommendations to the NEC, the international donor community, political parties and to Somaliland civil society including donor support to make the NEC a permanent body. We also noted that we were about to see the working out of a situation unique in Africa of a government without a numerical majority in parliament: perhaps another example – such as the hybrid system - of Somaliland providing lessons to the rest of Africa?

Whilst we believed and declared the elections to be ‘reasonably free and fair’ (given the prioritising in the polling process of transparency above secrecy), we were keen to stress throughout, given our work with local NGOs in such areas as capacity building, that this was just the beginning of the democratisation process. Somalilanders themselves addressed some of these problems in a series of regional and national workshops.

Post-election challenges
Economically there is drought and vulnerability of pastoral communities, with the loss of sales of livestock as a result of the Saudi export ban. Somaliland is not in a position to drive hard bargains from outsiders wishing to exploit natural resources etc. Lack of investment, apart from that emanating from the diaspora, can be linked to the lack of recognition which means would-be investors are worried by the lack of insurance, concerned whether financial institutions are reliable etc. Socially there is the qat chewing issue – which has social, environmental, gender as well as productivity implications. In terms of gender, Somaliland has patriarchal structures and practices; this is despite the existence of highly educated women with their involvement in political, civil society and business matters. Terrorism is an internal as well as an external matter. Somaliland blamed the jihadists attack just before the September 2005 elections on organised terrorist groups in Mogadishu, recruiting people from Somaliland and paid warlords militias. It must also be faced as an internal problem linked to wider international concerns

In the electoral/ democratisation/ political domain which is the one we concentrate on, there have been worries over human rights, an independent judiciary and the continued existence of emergency law plus creeping corruption and an increasing investment in internal security. The security mindset of the Siad Barre era and the continuation of certain personnel means that the necessity of following formal legal process (rather than arbitrary political action) is perhaps still not understood by all ministers and parts of the government who have, in the past, appeared surprised at objections to its practice, e.g. over the expulsion of EU delegate Ahmed Washington in 2005 and Roland Marechal[12].

In terms of a functioning parliament, the picture has been mixed with a somewhat turbulent start as the parties negotiated their relationship with each other and with the executive, helped by the consensus approach of the Guurti[13]. Subsequently there have been interesting pointers in matters of consensus, democratisation and nation building. There has been the formation of three subcommittees – which point to greater involvement in national affairs – justice and human rights, anti-corruption and environmental and rural communities. The majority of the MPs are new and while many of them are said to be better educated than their predecessors, they lack experience and are unfamiliar with the functions of parliament – although Interpeace has moved into Phase Two of the Democratisation Programme with a resource centre, parliamentary infrastructural improvement and IT training. The diaspora has also provided advice.

Achieving political consensus has been the cornerstone of stability in Somaliland, to the extent that uncomfortable compromises have been made at times. In the new parliament, the opposition is looking to form a coherent alliance and challenge the government on a number of fronts. The system of opposition parties having a parliamentary majority complicates matters such as collaboration between parliament and presidency, which has led to dispute on issues such as the increase of the Guurti term by four years. This was suggested by the President and approved by the Guurti and rejected by the lower house. The term of the Guurti ends in October 2006 with no solution in sight. Parliament is though, in the process of finalising the electoral law for Guurti elections, although these are not immediately likely. Despite this Somaliland has succeeded in reaching consensus on solving issues which could have been damaging to the country.

There has been surprising unanimity of all parties on occasion in relation to government. The two non-governing parties have been successful in exerting party discipline – picking a speaker and two deputies. Before that they had been seen as weak institutions showing little life outside election campaigns, with little internal democracy/ capacity/commitment to policy formulation. A major constraint has been resources. It is perhaps early days but we are yet to see signs of differentiation between the parties, or discern their internal dynamics as well as differentiated programmes and policies. How do they see coalition-building and internal discipline – in order to hold the executive to account? The opposition agenda, little of which has been yet achieved, includes revoking the emergency laws, reducing the size of the cabinet, transferring to Parliament a degree of effective power, reviewing the role and length of tenure of the Guurti, increasing fiscal accountability and transparency, reviewing media law, the security sector budget, decentralising government, examining the validity of a three-party system in a plural democracy[14].

There have been developments in the relationship between civil society groups, political parties and the government. Women’s groups and civil society groups have been waiting for Parliament to organise itself in order to lobby it, but are hopeful of a good working relationship: not least because several former civil society activists are MPs. Given that this was the first parliamentary election in 36 years (and the first time women were democratically elected to any Somali parliament) Somaliland has some claim in the progress of women’s representation. The lack of (but paradoxically growing) female representation and the wider political and economic participation overall have led to demands for an increase in set quotas/reserved seats for women in parliament. A Kulmiye woman MP who managed to campaign in Awdal region challenging men and clannism, has begun to focus on advocating for women’s issues in parliament. According to NAGAAD, the only chance for Somali women to have more MPs is through a quota system, meaning hard work by women activists to gain a constitutional review. At present this is at the informal workshops stage, involving meetings of CSOs, MPs and Guurti members with more men seeming to accept the idea. Parties will be under increasing pressure from women and civil society organisations to review their policies on female candidacy, ensuring that changes are made to structures, policies and personnel. Women in and out of parliament have called not only for affirmative action but also for exposure visits to learn from other African countries experience such as Uganda[15].

In electoral terms for the future, there needs to be the establishment of the new NEC as a sustainable and effective institution as the mandate of the current one expires. This could examine the problems of voter registration and census, essential both for holding elections and as part of the state-building process (by defining and counting citizens). It could also be part of the review of electoral law to consolidate and iron out contradictions in the existing legislation.

International support and role:
The international community, in particular the EU, has to date, shown its support for democratisation in Somaliland by funding the elections; following the elections, Somaliland received messages of congratulations from several countries and international bodies. Despite the lack of movement by the African Union, there is growing support for Somaliland with favourable indications from Riyale’s six nation tour of East Africa. But words alone will be insufficient. The institutions in place to sustain a democratic system in Somaliland need assistance. These include the NEC, parliament, the judiciary and the government itself. It will also be important for people in Somaliland to see the benefits of democracy, by investment in the country’s infrastructure and services and providing information on democratisation (not that Somaliland should accept or believe all of this uncritically). In the various Somali peace negotiations, the strategy of regional and international mediators was to park the issue of Somaliland, in order to protect the stability in the region. The international community should of course support a resolution to the crisis in the south, but in a multi-track way that does not hold Somaliland hostage to developments there. Obviously there is much to be done here with civil society initiatives that build on Somaliland’s consensual and peace-building approach – which space does not allow us to expand on here. Suffice it to say that we see the growing capacity of local NGOs in which we are involved as crucial in this.

A relationship of mutual respect between international and local NGOs is also key. There are, however, few international organisations working directly with women’s groups, human rights and research organisations, such as Hargeisa Womens Group Association (HAWO), Institute for Practical Research and Training in Somaliland (IPRT), Academy of Peace and Development, Nagaad Umbrella Organisation of Hargeisa Women NGOs, Samo-Talis, Womens Rehabilitation and Development Association (WORDA)[16].

The issue of diaspora funding is ambiguous. On the one hand it can be seen as providing both investment and good people-people initiatives and can be very productive (e.g. Amoud University). On the other hand it does not seem to nurture either a good relationship with the government or ensure that governments have to be accountable to tax payers as well as voters for policy etc. Similarly to Angola where there is 'a state without citizens' i.e. the government is entirely externally-oriented due to oil revenues, the Hargeisa government does not have to be accountable to its own citizens, if outsiders are relied upon for funding key elements of policy. We are not suggesting that the Angola case is directly comparable to Somaliland given the latter’s low tax base and very small revenue flows. However dependence on diaspora funding for much of the social services (hospitals, education – in fact most things bar security and the president's travel) mean the government does not concern itself with many elements that other governments do. Additionally many current and Egal era ministers and political party leaders have dual nationality and many Somalilanders joke that they ‘have a government in exile’ i.e. ministers (and political party leaders) etc spend more time soliciting support from the diaspora than working on policy at home or engaging with Somalilanders.

We suggest below some of the ways that civil society, diaspora and parliamentarians can bring about greater awareness of Somaliland’s achievements and help its push for democratisation (not to gainsay what is already happening).

Providing assistance to the emerging democratisation process. Areas might be the effective role of political parties, human rights training, media freedom issues, equality of gender representation etc. This needs a strong link to poverty reduction programmes.
Bringing awareness of the Somaliland peace-building approach.
Suggesting outside parliamentarians such as the UK APPG[17] liaise with their counterparts in selected African, European and other states to raise the profile of the case of Somaliland via parliamentary questions, briefings and encouraging their respective governments to encourage the development of a follow-up mechanism to the AU 2005 Fact-Finding report on Somaliland. Focusing pressure on states that are members of the AU's Peace and Security Council. Lobbying for joint investment opportunities in Somaliland.
Lobbying including via the G8 to provide grants for road infrastructure, expanding Berbera port, schools and clinics, as part of the Gleneagles agreement to provide poor countries with grants.
Engaging with the Nepad secretariat to look into post-conflict infrastructural development.
Seeking greater coordination between the various Somalilander organisations and support organisations abroad – and indeed Somali ones for people-people cooperation. Being aware of the dangers of dependency, whilst seeking greater coordination.
Lobbying on overcoming the Rift Valley Fever ban on livestock exports to Saudi Arabia.
Helping make the case that Somaliland is an existing fact and a coherent political entity. Drawing the parallels with what is happening in South Sudan and pursuing the agenda that the International Crisis Group (ICG) has put forward of e.g. an observer role for Somaliland in AU forums.

Conclusion
How best do outsiders, however sympathetic, concentrate on the issues we outline here of democratisation and development and perhaps more immediate questions facing people, parliament and government? Having staged three elections, the commitment of the Somaliland people and the political elite to a democratic form of politics cannot easily be questioned or ignored. To do so would make a mockery of the West’s commitment to support democracy. To ignore what has been achieved in a democratic Islamic country would also send the wrong message to Somalia and to countries in the region and the Middle East.

Most importantly let us not reinvent a process that has no purchase in Somaliland or indeed in Somalia. What we should look at is the way that the people of Somaliland brought peace through indigenous and understood forms – mechanisms of dialogue, clan structures, elders (and women’s input even if only behind the scenes?). In a sense this paper is an unfinished chapter in a wider story about how the mix of traditional and understood structures change, at what speed, and who controls and wants to control the process. The government is in the paradoxical position of having had to go its own way given the lack of international recognition, but its poverty and lack of resources means that it is in fact very dependent on the outside – both in terms of economic support and how the outside community views events in (wider) Somalia. Creative engagement on sensitively overcoming such dependence between those living in Somaliland including the government and those outside (diaspora or friends) will remain key for many years.


[1] Known before 2006 as the Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR), with its skillshare programme known in some countries, including Somaliland, as International Cooperation for Development (ICD). Dr. Steve Kibble is the advocacy coordinator for Africa/ Yemen and Dr. Adan Abokor is the country representative for Somaliland. Progressio as CIIR acted as joint coordinator for the international election observers in September/ October 2005. It has played a role in the setting up of Somaliland Focus (UK) and the UK All-Party Parliamentary Group on Somaliland (APPG).
[2] Members of the diaspora with dual nationalities have played an important role. They left their homeland as adults being familiar with traditional systems to engage with the democratic systems in the North.
[3] There is much debate on how relevant the term civil society is for countries like Somaliland, notably from commentators such as Ioan Lewis.
[4] Although we should not underestimate in this hybrid system the role of Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, the founder of UDUB, in the multi-party system/democratisation process in Somaliland, but stemming from his experience as an ‘old guard’ in Somali politics.
[5] There is uncertainty following the African Union fact-finding mission which declared in 2005 that Somaliland's status was "unique and self-justified in African political history," and that "the case should not be linked to the notion of 'opening a Pandora's box.' However a decision was put off under Arab pressure at the summit meeting of African Union heads of state meeting in July 2006 in Banjul.
[6] The assassination of Yahye, the head of a peace research organisation affiliated with the War Torn Societies Project (WSP now Interpeace) is greatly concerning in this context.
[7] Abokor, Bradbury, Kibble etc ‘Very much a Somaliland-run election’: Report of the Somaliland local elections. 2003. CIIR. www.progressio.org.uk
[8] We coordinated other teams, but were only responsible for choosing our own election team personnel. Other teams released their own report on the elections as well e.g. the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa.
[9] Abokor and Kibble (2006) ibid
[10] A complicating factor is that Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, chairperson of the Islamic Courts in Mogadishu and previously one of the leaders of A-Itihad Al-Islamiya, a militant group involved in violent acts in Ethiopia and Somalia/Somaliland was among 15 defendants (seven including Sheikh Aweys in absentia) being tried for this attack.
[11] International Election Observation team interim report on the Somaliland elections to the House of Representatives 29 September 2005, issued 7 October 2005, available at www.progressio.org.uk. The findings and recommendations of the interim report were incorporated in the final report.
[12] Compounded some would say by lack of Presidential control over some ministers,their calibre and the oversized cabinet which the recent reshuffle did not address. This is with the exception of the new Minister of Planning who is a retired senior officer of the ILO and highly respected personality, which gave the international agencies working in Somaliland great relief.
[13] One might omit from this assertion the latter’s recent desire to hang on to their positions.
[14] The three parties emerged arose from the leading political groupings in the 2002 local elections as a mechanism to ensure that parties did not represent single clans and had broad-based support across regions – although clan as ever is the unstated invisible fact of Somaliland politics.
[15] See the expected paper to this convention on this.
[16] National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and Progressio undertake much of this work.
[17] Briefing to the APPG by Somaliland Focus (UK) 28th June 2006 available from SF(UK) website.

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