27 January, 2007

The Gadabuursi Manifesto Part 2 Of 2..By Dr. Abdishakur Jowhar

The Gadabuursi Manifesto Part 2 Of 2
Dr Abdishakur Jowhar — Toronto, Canada — 26 January, 2007

The Gadabuursi Manifesto Part 2 of 2

Dr. Abdishakur Jowhar

abdijowhar@yahoo.com

The first part of this document dealt with the myth of the tribal president and the issues of reform and revolution. The reader is strongly advised to read part 1 first.

III)On Corruption

Africa is a continent with the highest rate of corruption and worst health and quality of life indices in the world.� Africa loses $150bn to corruption each year. That is 6 times more than the sum total of all the developmental assistance it receives. There are international network of criminal lawyers, Mafiosi, front companies and family members who �assist� Africa�s Robber Presidents to devastate the economy and hope of the continent. Somaliland is no different from the rest of Africa. Indeed here corruption has a semi official status with Government ministers openly justifying it as a necessary evil. Every Somalilander has experienced horror stories of corruption at a personal level. Indeed corruption at the local, regional and national levels has reached a level that is no longer compatible with a functioning state apparatus.�

Corruption kills. Every $100 misappropriated steals the life of 10 children who would prematurely die of diarrhea that could have been effectively treated with less than $10 per child. Corruption is more about indirect murder than it is about theft.� Every $100 stolen condemns 10 children to a life time of illiteracy and darkness. Corruption glorifies theft and makes mockery of decency and hard work. It destroys the dignity, honor and moral fiber of the nation. �

Corruption lives in secrecy and thrives in darkness of the night. Public exposure is the most effective tool a nation can deploy against the corrupt. Oppression, intimidation and even assassination of those who expose the looting are integral to the process of robbing the national purse of a population already half starving to death.

The Gadabuursi tribe takes the stand that corruption is equal to theft; equal to murder of the soul of a nation; corruption is equal to shame and disgrace. The tribe calls the nation to banish this evil from its midst.

The tribe speaks truth to its son: Mr. President you have reached the proverbial fork in the road. The times are forcing upon you choices that you can not avoid. We believe that you are being ill advised by your carpet beggars of every tribe whose feeding tubes are illicitly bleeding the national purse to bankruptcy. So we, the moral majority of the tribe, give you realistic alternative options out of love, kinship and respect. The choice of course is yours and so are the consequences.�

  1. Choose to be accountable and transparent. Open your private books for public scrutiny. Show the nation what you earned and how you earned it. Expect such a level of transparency and accountability from your ministers and other appointed high officials. Practice the politics of honesty and dignity and you will win over the public. Keep in mind this is the code of ethics that prevails among all democratic societies in the world. This is the Gadabuursi way of leadership, the way of Ali Hussein. We want to hear again the beautiful verse �Daacadi Ninkeedi Dishay �Daawo Gadabuursi�
  2. Un-choose the worn out road of incarcerating those who dare to speak. Such a route leads to no where. It is a counterproductive route for it says to the nation at large �look I am hiding something sinister. It serves as an admission of guilt in the public eye. It is the preferred route for tin pot dictators. It is a direct encouragement to the really corrupt to go wild on the public purse with impunity. It is a Un-Gadabuursi route. Abandon this route of the corrupt lest you be tainted by it. The tribe prays for you to be blessed with the courage of owning up to your faults and the wisdom of self correction.
  3. No one is above the law. Neither press nor president. That is the beauty of the concept of equality under the law. And so for redress of your personal grievances against members of the media follow the laws of the land. Seek justice as clearly detailed in the press law. Trample not on the laws that you swore to uphold in search of personal or familial vindication.

IV) On Freedom of the Press

The central crisis we face today is not about corruption. It is about the constitution. The Somaliland state has clearly refused to abide by the laws of the nation. It has summarily and unceremoniously set aside the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and free press. It has arbitrarily arrested journalists. By its actions it has nullified central aspects of the constitution at its whim. We are threatened with a situation, once again, where the nation is at risk of falling under the whim of one man. There is no way to sugar coat these facts.

The constitutional crisis is of such a central importance to the existence of the nation that it is no longer President Riyaale�s lone responsibility to resolve. The house and Guurti must take it on to the exclusion of everything else. The three political parties must do nothing else, work on nothing else and think of nothing else until the law of the land is upheld, until the journalists of the nation can work freely without fear of arbitrary arrest and incarceration.

Let it be know to all and sundry. We have to exist as a nation of free people before we can fight corruption or poverty or ignorance or intolerance. It is our freedom that is under immediate threat. All of us are prisoners-in-waiting. We might not be behind bars as yet, but we are not free as long as the three heroes of the nation Gaboobe, Dini and Mohamed Omer Sheikh remain in the dungeons of the state.

The Gadabuursi urges the nation to engage itself in the defense of its constitution, its freedom and its heroic journalists. Freedom is indivisible. Freedom is non tribal; it is an urgent national cause. We appeal to nation to defend its freedom for without it nationhood becomes devoid of soul and substance.

    1. On Freedom of the Airwaves

The tribe reminds the nation that free radio stations are prohibited in Somaliland. In a society with an illiteracy rate of 80% the abolition of Radio services, the only means of communication that does not require reading, is equivalent to the abolition of free speech. This offensive misappropriation of the national will was implemented with a ministerial edict in 2002 in the early days of Riyaale's administration. It slipped below the radar of public awareness and it started the nation on the slippery slope of one man monologues and one man rule. We should have fought back then, for it is the reason why we find ourselves today fighting a battle for our freedom to speak, once again. It is not too late yet, it is never too late. We have won over more formidable foes. We will prevail this time too.�

In an August 2006 interview with BBC Somali service President Riyaale openly defended his refusal to allow free radio stations in Somaliland. The president cited the horrific role the private radio station Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) played in the Rwandan Genocide of 1994. The president used this as justification for his decision to prohibit free Radio stations in Somaliland. It appears that the great and kind president is determined to prevent Somaliland tribes from massacring each other like the Hutu and Tutsi of Rwanda.

True RTLM was a private radio station. It systematically laid the ground work for mass murder of close to a million men, women and children of the Tutsi and moderate Hutu of Rwanda. The radio was a symbol of evil and no radio like it should ever be allowed into the airwaves of any nation.

Here is what the president did not tell the public: Radio Mille Collines (RTLM) was launched in 1993, backed by family members of the Hutu President Juvenal Habyarimana. It was privately� owned by members close to the government.� It broadcasted its hate message using government owned equipment of Radio Rwanda. It broadcasted nothing but government propaganda. The government of Rwanda used this radio station to prepare the ground for the genocide of the Tutsi. In all but name the RTLM was, like radio Hargaysa, the property of the government of the day and its propaganda mouthpiece. President Riyaale's justification for the prohibition of free speech in the airwaves of Somaliland is therefore only half true. Half-truths are worse and much more deceptive than outright lies.

The tribe calls to the nation�s attention that genocide is a totalitarian byproduct, managed, orchestrated and achieved through a monopoly on the word. The prohibition on the freedom of the airwaves represents the biggest threat to the security, peace and safety of the nation. We assume the kind president who is intent upon preventing tribal massacres knows this too. The deception must therefore serve some other purpose; the purpose that has defeated the African state, the purpose of holding on to power at any cost.

Let us keep our eyes on the prize. The historic challenge facing us today is to ensure freedom of speech in all its forms for ourselves and for our progeny. Let us push back against the forces of oppression and opportunism. Let us snatch victory from the darkness of the moment. Rest not until the evil monopoly of the state on the airwaves is defeated. To paraphrase the American motto; Let us live free or die trying!.

NB The Gadabuursi Manifesto is penned by Dr. Jowhar. It is however the product of collective tribal enterprise. The document represents the silent majority of Gadabuursi opinion both inside the country and in Diaspora. It is an attempt to recruit tribal culture for sustaining life and liberty of all and preventing it from continuing to remain a hiding place for the evil, the corrupt, the opportunist, the hate monger and the murderer. The manifesto is meant to be a blue print for all Somali tribes. Dr. Jowhar and the silent partners he consulted in preparing the Manifesto belong to the Gadabuursi tribe. The decision is to speak truth to power; truth to President Riyaale who also belongs to the same tribe

22 January, 2007

Reconstruction and Democratisation in Somaliland

(for a PDF version of this item, click here )

AbstractAn examination, by Dr Steve Kibble of Progressio, in association with his colleague Dr Adan Abokor, of the issues facing Somaliland in its unique process of democratisation, considering the contrast between traditional clan systems and westernised democratic ideals. It provides an assessment of the impact that the international community and those within Somaliland are having on the process. It makes recommendations for improvement in the future and highlights the obstacles that Somalilanders face in their drive for reconstruction, noting the indicators of a relapse into authoritarianism that threaten to undermine Somaliland democratisation.
Malign external intervention has characterised the Horn of Africa - as in the rest of Africa, leaving a legacy of instability, non-rational borders, and weak and skewed states. Somaliland might be said to be poised between 'traditional' structures arising from clan society and the ideas emanating from civil society (often influenced by time spent in the diaspora) on more Western forms of democratisation.

Successes and Challenges for Somaliland.Somaliland's model of development has had some success and for some is the first indigenous modern African form of government with a fusion of traditional forms of organisation within a democratising framework containing an emphasis on self-reliance as a legitimate post-colonial option for Africa.
However there are major challenges with this mix of clan system and democratisation. Additionally lack of international recognition means that Somaliland has not been able to access multilateral donor development assistance or the support of international financial institutions, over the past decade.
Another problem that illustrates different views on identity as well as affecting stability and recognition questions is Somaliland's eastern border. Since 1998, Somaliland's authority over eastern Sanaag and Sool regions has been contested by the autonomous Puntland State of Somalia - illustrating a territorial clash between different identities
However, Michael Walls, the chair of Somaliland Focus UK, thought that Somaliland political stability was greater than many superficial observations might suggest. 'The government is often heavy-handed but ultimately accedes to Somali norms of discussion and negotiated compromise. Everything is not rosy, but constitutional crises acknowledged, the Somaliland
system is more robust than many believe.'

Women's positionEqual participation in politics, remains a distant possibility for women as long as the dominant patriarchal social frameworks under which they live continue to work to maintain the status quo. Civil society in Somaliland outside clan structures is, though, beginning to assert itself, not least through women's groups which began with attempts to use their outsider status precisely as mediators in conflict. There has been substantial growth in both women's groups and their understanding of the situation facing them.
The idea of set quotas / reserved seats for women in parliament is being increasingly vociferously raised. This is felt to be one of the best ways to increase women's representation and increase their participation and profile overall. Given that the 2005 election was the first parliamentary election in 36 years (and the first time women were democratically elected to a Somali Parliament), Somaliland has some claim to be making progress on representation of women.
RecognitionThe recognition issue is a key litmus test for Somalilanders. In 1999, the then President Egal argued that democratisation would facilitate international recognition. In May 1999, the Hargeisa government approved a plan to move from the clan-based system to a multi-party political system -providing the proposed parties were not based on tribal or religious lines and drew supportfrom all regions. In 2001 a referendum on the new constitution was conducted in Somaliland. In December 2002 and April 2003, the local government district councils and the presidential elections, and the 2005 parliamentary elections were held respectively in a reasonably free and fair manner.

For Somaliland leaders, everything is subsumed under the desire for recognition - seen very much as all or nothing and as though recognition was the solution for all problems. Equally there is the strong determination not to go back into Somalia. At the same time the inheritance of the postcolonial state structure (and indeed personnel) means that the temptation is often to solve problems through authoritarian solutions such as the gaoling of Qaran politicians and also of journalists from the independent media for exposingcorruption at Presidential level.
International support and role:Diplomats including those advising Somaliland worry that it is not taking opportunities from recent crises, including engaging more proactively with major international institutions. At a recent presidential press conference, the President reiterated the dogmatic view 'that Somaliland is independent from Somalia and there is no need for dialogue with TFG and that the only dialogue Somaliland could have with the South in the future is about mutual interest like two neighbouring countries.'
Civil society and people-people initiativesCivil society is active in areas of social services and democratisation, playing an important role in the last three elections through their contribution to civic education, local electoral observation and especially through women's NGOs. There are, however, few international organisations working directly with women's groups, human rights and research organisations. What is needed isfunding agencies which respond to local NGO needs as nascent organisations. A relationship of mutual respect between international and local NGOs is also key.

The role of the diasporaThe issue of diaspora funding is ambiguous. On the one hand it can be seen as providing both investment and good people-people initiatives and can be very productive (e.g. Amoud University). On the other hand it does not seem to nurture either a good relationship with the government or ensure that governments have to be accountable to tax payers as well as voters for policyetc. The Hargeisa government does not have to be accountable to its own citizens, if outsiders are relied upon for funding key elements of policy.
ConclusionHaving staged three elections, the commitment of the Somaliland people and the political elite to a democratic form of politics cannot easily be questioned or ignored. To do so would make a mockery of the West's commitment to support democracy. To ignore what has been achieved in a democratic Islamic country would also send the wrong message to Somalia and tocountries in the region and the Middle East.
The government is in the paradoxical position of having had to go its own way given the lack of international recognition, but its poverty and lack of resources means that it is in fact very dependent on the outside - both in terms of economic support and how the outside community views events in (wider) Somalia. Creative engagement on sensitively overcoming such dependence between those living in Somaliland including the government and those outside (diaspora or friends) will remain key for many years.

http://samotalis.blogspot.com/

21 January, 2007

The Gadabuursi Manifesto .. By Dr. Abdishakur Jowhar

The Gadabuursi Manifesto - January 21, 2007 - 02:32

Prelude

2006 has been a particularly difficult year for Somaliland. The nation barely held together against the onslaught of the religious right only to face a fresh challenge from the petty dictatorships that plaques the African continent. The punches keep coming. The year ended with freedom in chains and with the Editor and the Publisher of Haatuf (the central defenders of the nation) behind bars. But the nation keeps standing, swaying gracefully with each strike. In these dire circumstances the Gadabuursi comes to the aid of the nation and offers guidance to its president.

Let the obvious be stated. The election of President Dahir Riyaale Kahin was a magnanimous act of national healing and a symbol of national maturity. And for the Gadabuursi it was also a joyous moment of coming in from the cold fringes of political wilderness to its very center. President Riyaale became the very first member of the tribe to carry such a lofty title, at least in the modern history of the Somali people. We bristled with pride. We were ecstatic with his delivery of three elections in rapid succession for the benefit of the nation; elections that were judged free and fair by impartial observers. This surely was a feat that has eluded many of the brightest minds of Africa's political elite and here was one humble Gadabuursi who could deliver it for his nation. We sang his praises and pointed out for all who had eyes to see; look for the grace of God; there goes a righteous Gadabuursi.

These were the golden days, many moons ago, before the tide turned, before corruption found a home in the palace, way before freedom found itself behind bars. At this critical moment the Gadabuursi tribe comes to terms with the moral responsibly of taking an ethical stand when its own son falters, when the line between right and wrong blurs. Silence in this circumstance will be tantamount to a criminal act. In this Manifesto the tribe speaks so that the nation can live out its ideals of peace, modernity and democracy.

The Manifesto

On the Myth of the Tribal President

The Gadabuursi tribe is fully aware its fortunes will rise and fall with those of all the people in this nation. The tribe will prosper if the nation finds prosperity. The tribe will have peace if there is peace in the nation. The tribe will have justice if justice prevails in the nation's courts. And the tribe will suffer injustice, starvation, pestilence, war and death if the nation falls apart. It is that simple and the tribe understands it.

A president serves a state, a nation not a tribe or a clan. The very term tribal president is an oxymoron. It is a myth that has sucked the life out of all Somali societies; it is a monster that we must slay if Somalis are to survive as people. For the Gadabuursi and for the nation the 20-mile heartbreak road between Dilla and Borama should serve as a living testimony for the impotence of the concept of a tribal presidency that lives only in the sickness of the tribal mind.

The Gadabuursi tribe enters into a covenant with the nation that it will not allow this President (the son of the tribe) to appeal overtly or covertly to the primitive irrational tribal instinct to hijack national justice, to cover up corrupt practices or to curb the freedom of the citizens of the nation. The tribe will not allow this president to do to it what Siyad Barre did to the Mareexaan, to the Somali nation and ultimately to his own family. The Gadabuursi have no desire for national suicide; no appetite for the rule of a despot and the death of a nation.

Let there be peace for every citizen, justice for every citizen, prosperity for every citizen.

(II) On Reform, Revolution and the Problem President

We live in a formative era. Our nation, the nation of Somaliland, and its social order of democratic dispensation, are under constant threat. We barely survived a voracious revolutionary movement just to be faced by the nightmare in the making that has replaced it. Both threats were born out of the frustration of millions of our brothers in South Somalia and both have shaken Somaliland to the core. Because, and this is important, because the Somaliland system of governance as it evolved under the leadership of president Riyaale in the past few years has weakened the nation like a pillar consumed by termites (sidii UDUB Xar Galay), because the weakened body politic has become too susceptible to adverse encounters of any type.

The mis-government of the nation has turned it into seething pool of explosive conflict, and a breeding ground for revolutionary zest. For those who don't know already a revolution is not the same as a raid from Somalia or Ethiopia. This may happen but it will be an invasion not a revolution. Somaliland united (any nation united) can stand up to any invasion however mighty. A revolution is a different story altogether. By its very definition it is a radical and violent social experiment. Blood is its normal currency, the blood of those who rule first and that of the ruled later when the violence is institutionalized. A revolution is an internal construct, a homemade product; it cannot be imported or exported. It originates, grows and explodes within the body of a nation. The system in Somaliland is pregnant with revolution and dangerously close to eruption. The drumbeat of the impending revolt is deafening. And the president is deaf. To speak plainly the president is oblivious. To speak plainly the president has become the problem of the nation.

So the tribe warns its wayward son. This is no exaggerated prophecy of doom. Power imposes a peculiar blindness on those who come to possess it. Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife Elena met their end in surprise in the hands of bloodthirsty revolutionaries. Mussolini and his wife met a similar fate in Piazzale Loretto in Milan. They never saw it coming. Siyad Barre had to be smuggled out of Villa Somalia in the middle of a dark night to end his days in the misery of exile. Be forewarned son of the tribe. Be thus advised.

And the tribe also bears good news for its son: Reform. Serious reform will heal the president, and the presidency. It will rescue the nation from the edge of the precipice. Serious reform is the effective antidote to the revolution. And this here, this manifesto is guide to reform. Burying the presidential head in sand like an ostrich would not do the job, futile attempts of placing truth in prison will not do the trick and would surely end up being counter productive. The unjust and vengeful incarceration of Gaboobe, the Nelson Mandela of Somaliland and his colleagues will be nothing but the last straw that will break the back of this presidency. The tribe counsels its son to get the courage of confronting his blunders.

The tribe is wise to this: What has been said so far is not what the President is hearing from the court jesters and carpet beggars that surround him. The main job of these parasitic hangers-on is to soothe the presidential ego, stoke his grandiosity and gloss over the errors of his ways. They do that because that is how they feed. They have to keep the tap running. They are not friends of the President. They are friends of the president's pocket. They are the curse on the African Presidency. And they always manage to disappear on a president the day after.

And the tribe tells its son: Fear not Aweys. Fear not the Aweys inspired. Fear not Yusuf and the memories of the Las. Fear only the intransigence of the human soul that prevents critical self examination. Fear your court jesters and your carpet beggars. Fear your ego, your grandiosity and your inflating sense of entitlement. Fear the enemy within!

Part II will follow

Author's note: NB The Gadabuursi Manifesto is penned by Dr. Jowhar. It is however the product of collective tribal enterprise. The document represents the silent majority of Gadabuursi opinion both inside the country and in Diaspora. It is an attempt to recruit tribal culture for sustaining life and liberty of all and preventing it from continuing to remain a hiding place for the evil, the corrupt, the opportunist, the hate monger and the murderer. The manifesto is meant to be a blue print for all Somali tribes. Dr. Jowhar and the silent partners he consulted in preparing the Manifesto belong to the Gadabuursi tribe. The decision is to speak truth to power; truth to President Riyaale who also belongs to the same tribe.

Dr. Abdishakur Jowhar
abdijowhar@yahoo.com

17 January, 2007

The collapse of the Islamic courts: What future for Somalia and what impact on Somaliland?

by Adan Abokor and Steve Kibble
The sudden collapse within 10 days of the Somali Islamic Courts as a governing body and the unconventional military fighting force against the Ethiopian army and the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) provides an opportunity and a threat for Somalis simultaneously.
The situation in the region and in the self-declared Republic of Somaliland is also similarly unpredictable and precarious.

There is, however, continuity in that the Ethiopian intervention marks just another phase in a long line of outside interference in Somalia, internationally and regionally. The dangers of Islamist guerrillas, Somalis and non-Somalis - seeking revenge for what they see as a Western/Christian plot to keep a weak and divided Somalia permanently under their control, and of a relapse into the previous warlord-controlled anarchy remain high.
The similarities to Afghanistanor Iraq, in which a lengthy guerrilla war drains rapid military success through an expensive and dubious project are stark. Many see Ethiopiaas the instrument of the USA eager to destroy a regime it saw as linked to Al-Qaida and protecting those responsible for the 1998 attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and other atrocities.
Washington claims that the three main suspects are Comorian Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, Kenyan Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan and Abu Taha al-Sudani of Sudan. The Islamists deny any al Qaida links, alleging it is intended to justify intervention. However, Ethiopia also has interests of its own, including the need to counter enemies such as Eritrea, and its long-lasting aim of maintaining a weak client Somali state.

The US has until recently, when it disastrously armed the warlords against the Islamic courts, been wary of direct intervention, and any repeat of the 'Black Hawk Down' of the 1990s when it was forced to withdraw from the country after sustaining losses of US marines. However, its support for overturning the arms embargo in the recent UN resolution, its provision of intelligence and surveillance to the Ethiopians, and its unilateralist attitude concentrating only on the war against terror have dismayed European diplomats, and certainly Somalis.
In the first known direct U.S. intervention, an AC-130 plane piloted by the Special Operations Command from the U.S.counter-terrorism base in Djibouti, attacked the southern village of Hayoin the week of 8 January 2007. According to US sources, an al Qaida member heading operations in east Africawas among the Islamists there, and may have been amongst those killed. Other strikes followed.

For six months the Islamic Courts had exercised a rough and ready rule over Mogadishu and the southern parts of the country, with some civil support, especially as they had routed the brutal and kleptocratic warlords. Although they have now either melted away or been pushed to the Kenyan border, there is still a long way to go to establish long-term stability in the country.
There is, however, a centrally- established government in control of the Somali capital for the first time since 1978, symbolised by President Abdillahi Yusuf's first visit to Mogadishu. The President insisted that the Ethiopians were not occupiers and would leave soon. They "did not come to occupy Somaliaand they will leave Somali territories as soon as regional and international forces start to deploy", he told the pan-Arab Asharq al-Awsat newspaper.
Whether that government will stay in control and extend its authority throughout the country will depend on four elements.

That is, whether it can control the warlords who previously looted and preyed upon the population, and many see the TFG as being composed of warlords itself. Secondly, whether it can rein in young lawless men with weapons but no hopes of employment except by using them, and to do so the government has equally to rein in the warlords first. Prime Minister Ali Gedi initially tried to weaken the warlords by telling all Somaliamilitias to disarm within three days and had over all their weapons at collection points. However, this is hardly realistic in a clan-based society which has been ruled by the gun since the fall of the Siad Barre government in 1991. Somalis think in terms of clan security and for the Hawiye clan, who are the major inhabitants of Mogadishu, to give away their arms to the TFG while the TFG forces mostly comprise Darood clan fighters, especially of the Majerteen (President Abdullahi's sub-clan), was out of question. Therefore the disarming issue has been delayed after demonstrations against it in Mogadishu.

The third issue that the present government has to grapple with is: how to deal with the defeated Islamists, if not the leaders at least the rank and file. Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki, chair of the seven-nation regional grouping of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, is urging President Yusuf to resume the Khartoum talks with the Islamic Courts that were broken off, as indeed have the European members of the Contact Group on Somalia who have been largely ignored by the unilateralism of the US. The Somali government under external pressure has promised an amnesty to Islamic Courts rank and file fighters, but says their leaders will face prosecution, those that are still alive, that is.
Lastly, stability will depend on the short- and medium-term actions of the transition government and the response of the international community, especially Somalia's neighbours. There are worrying indications that the authoritarianism of the Islamic courts will be continued with a number of radio and television stations being shut down for 24 hours under state of emergency laws. The editors of HornAfrik radio and television, Shabelle Media Network, Radio Voice of Holy Koran and Al Jazeera Television were told to report to the National Security agency.

Although they were able to resume broadcasting, threats to media freedom remain high.
In terms of the region, so far aid promises are minimal, far less than the cost of the bombs falling on Southern Somalia. Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi says his forces will leave Somalia within weeks rather than months since the cost has been 'huge' and beyond their means. He has already asked for international assistance for his 'operation to curb extremism in the Horn'. In Mogadishu attacks on joint Ethiopian-Somali armed forces have already started with soldiers in armed vehicles being killed and injured. It is expected that these hit and run tactics will continue as long as Ethiopian forces are in Mogadishu.
The intervention has had heavy political costs at home (given that the country is almost equally divided along Christian and Muslim lines) as well as abroad. Zenawi's increasingly-repressive government faces multiple internal challenges from the civil society, and within the Ogaden (the Somali region inside Ethiopia) etc. The ONLF (Ogaden National Liberation Front) attacked an Ethiopian convoy of armed forces in Region Five of Ethiopia and the Ethiopians responded by killing and burning villages in that region.

The Arab League and the African Union (the latter reversing its support for intervention after only a day) have both called for the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from Somalia, as has the European Union and the new UN Secretary General. Despite the bombing of one of its border posts at Har Har, the Kenyan government has so far been sympathetic to the new rulers in Mogadishu, despite its rivalry with Addis Ababa. It sealed its 700km border to fleeing Islamic Courts fighters and arrested 11 of their leaders fleeing across the border. It also called for a summit of regional leaders to discuss new developments.
Ali Gedi, maintains, however, that Ethiopian forces will be needed for some months to shore up his weak, small and inadequately trained army. On previous experience, it will take several months to finance, assemble, equip and deploy the 8,000-strong regional peacekeeping force called for by the AU. At the moment it appears that the deployment of African forces from the region to maintain peace in Somalia would be more generally accepted by the people as a more attractive alternative to Ethiopian troops. It is very difficult to imagine the TFG controlling Somalia without the support of the Ethiopians because the former has no effective armed forces or capacity to rule a war-torn country.

Nor does it appear that any peace-keeping forces from the region would be in a position to defend the TFG from local militias or the remaining supporters of the Islamists. The warlords are also returning to Mogadishu and cities like Kismaayo and Jowhar, although not officially as heads of militias but rather as members of the TFG Parliament. One of the strongest Mogadishu warlords, Suudi Yelahow, travelled through Hargeisa on his way to Mogadishu, being welcomed by the UCID party chairperson, Speaker of the Parliament and the Mayor of Hargeisa since the warlord was always sympathetic to Somaliland independence.
For Somaliland the message might be more mixed. There were signs inside the country in areas like Burco that there was some sympathy for the Islamist message (although historically there has always been such support) given the failure of Hargeisa to bring much development or prosperity (although one needs to be cautious about seeing radical Islamism as appealing just to the poor).

Suspicions remain in relation to the TFG whose leader was the previous leader of Puntland and responsible in their eyes for much of the border instability between the two Somali entities. On the other hand the leader of the Islamic courts Sheikh Aweys had been found guilty in absentia of planning Islamist attacks in Somaliland, and the Islamic courts movement in general was very keen to harness Somali nationalism to Islamism and very opposed to federalism in general and Somaliland's independence in particular. In previous years foreigners were killed in Somaliland by a group linked to the radical jihadist elements in the Courts, but the courts authority never extended to Somalilandwhich with a functioning secular legal system never established shari'a courts unlike in the south. There has been no response from the Islamists supporters in the media or the general Somalilandpublic. It appears that the Somaliland authorities managed the situation in some parts of Somaliland very well before the war in the South, such as releasing the Burco Sultan who was imprisoned briefly for forming a committee to press for the application of Sharia law among the Habar Yonis sub-clan of which he was one of the sultans.

The situation is calm in Hargeisa and other regions, with the Somaliland government proclaiming neutrality in relation to the situation in the South. Certainly the Islamists fleeing Mogadishu and other cities which the Union of Islamic Courts controlled did not attempt to take refuge in Somaliland believing it unsafe or unable to gain access by land. There will be demonstrations called for by the government to proclaim Somaliland's independence and sovereignty.

The only significant incident was when Ali Gedi, following the Islamists defeat, declared all the Somali borders (including Somaliland) closed for flights, ships or vehicles by land. There was an immediate response from the Somaliland Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdillahi M. Dualle, saying that Gedi's announcement was not relevant to Somalilandsince the latter is a separate state. He further declared that airports and seaports within Somaliland territory were open as normal to all commercial flights and ships. Passenger flights and ships carrying livestock for the Hajj season continued to arrive in Somaliland without interruption. In an interview immediately after Somaliland's response to closing the Somali borders, Gedi said that the TFG had no intention of attacking or sending forces to Somaliland- a wise move given the relative strength of forces and the fact that Ethiopia remains close to the government in Hargeisa. According to local newspaper Haatuf President Rayale will travel to Ethiopia shortly, although the aim was not stated. Somaliland-Ethiopian relations remain strong. There is constant consultation on issues of border and trade security, and the Ethiopians living in the country were not affected by the war in the South.

The other positive move for Somaliland is that the cold war between it and the autonomous region of Puntland has died down as the focus shifted to the conflict in South and Central Somalia. Puntland and its forces were defending the TFG in the South as well as defending their own territory from the Union of Islamic Courts. Therefore the Puntland militias stationed in Sool region (historically part of Somaliland) facing Somalilandarmed forces have been reduced in numbers.
Whilst the threat from Islamists have receded for Somalilanders, there remain both external and internal problems. Having brought the TFG to power, how will Ethiopiadeal with Somaliland? Will they persuade the TFG to leave Somaliland alone, or persuade Somaliland to dialogue with the TFG in order to mitigate one danger facing them of the tie-up of Somali nationalism to political Islam?

The recent airstrikes and the ongoing conflict has compounded the suffering of the population in Southern Somalia already experiencing drought and poverty. The existing high degree of uncertainty and instability which for a time the rule of the Islamic Courts did something to abate is now back and whilst it would be unlikely for the Courts to be able to regroup for some time, the possibilities of renewed violent warfare remain high.
Adan Abokor and Steve Kibble, Progressio, 17 January 2007

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