BARNAAMIJ SIYAASADEEDKA XISBIGA KULMIYE 2008

Barnaamijka

XISBIGA MIDNIMADA IYO HORUMARINTA SOMALILAND
KULMIYE

BARNAAMIJ SIYAASADEEDKA XISBIGA KULMIYE 2008

FARRIINTA GUDDOOMIYAHA:

Labaatan iyo dheeraadkii sannadood ee tegey, waxaan si uun ugu soo dhex-jirey siyaasadaha Somaliland. Guddoomiyihii ugu muddada dheeraa ee Ururkii Dhaq-dhaqaaqa Waddaniga Somaliyeed (SNM) ahaan, iyo Guddoomiyaha Xisbiga Kulmiye ahaan, waxaan is-idhaahdaa nasiib baad leedahay ama waad ducaysan tahay. Sannadadaas, waxa nala soo gudboonaaday wey badnaayeen. Mararka qaar niyad jab wuu igu dhacayey marnaba se maan rajo-beelin. Waxa igu caawinayey inaan sii wado hawsha wuxuu ahaa keni-adayggii aad ugu hiilineyseen caddaaladda iyo go'aansigiinii inaad u halgantaan mustqbal fiican. Haddii aynu bilawnay waddada dheer ee dib-dhiska dalka iyo nidaaminta bulshada, waxaan ku kalsoonahay inaynu adeegsan doono dib-u-soo-kabashada aad muujiseen, si wada-jir ahna aynnu uga midho-dhalin doono isku-deyada inoo suurto-gelinaya inaynu gaadhno yoolalkeena fog.

Halgankii dalka lagaga xoreeyey Kelidii-Taliyahii naxariista darraa ee ina Siyaad Barre, wuxuu ahaa mid inagu jooga qiime aan la ilaabi Karin oo naf iyo maalba leh. Iyadoo burburka la taaban karo iyo qoomaha xiska inaga gaadhey ay xusuus-reeb inoo ahaan doonaan, haddana nefis baynu ka hellay guushii aynu ka guuleysaney Taliskii bahalka ahaa, taasaana ina siinaysa inaynnu laban-laabno niyad-adaygga aynu ku dhisaynno nolosheena iyo dalkeena quruxda badan. Idinkoo dareenkiina ka tarjumaya , isla markii ay burburtay dawladdii dhexe ee Somaliyaba, dagaallada sokeeyena bilaabmeen, ayaa inaa karti u leedihiin inaad tashataan mar kale ku caddayseen ku-dhawaaqiddii dib-ula soo-noqoshada madax-bannaanidii Somaliland ee Burco 18kii May, 1991, ee aad ku dhisateen dawladdii ugu horraysey ee Somaliland ee uu madaxweynaha ka ahaa, Cabdiraxmaan Axmed Cali.

Si aydin u sugtaan midnimada ayaa dhidibbada ugu taagteen dawladnimadiina Shirbeeleedyadii kala dambeeyey ee Borama iyo Hargeysa iyo ansixintii dastuurka ee xigtey (oo dhalisay ku tallaabsi dimuqraadiyad dhab ah) ee lagu xaqiijiyey aftidii taariikhiiga ahayd ee dastuurka ee oggolaanshaha 97% keligiin ugu buriseen israacii 1960kii.

Waxa idiinku dhiirrri-gelinayey ridistii, qiime kasta ha ku kacdee, kelidii-taliyaha wuxuu ahaa doonistiinii iyo ku-talagalkiinii ahaa inaad soo celisaan dimuqraadiyadda, xorriyadda hadalka, iyo hab-raaca sharciga (due process of law), oo dhammaantood lagama-maarmaan u ah horumarinta nidaam xukumeed oo xaqdhawra xuquuqda aasaasiga ah. Qiime-soorradaasi (qiyamkaasi) waa qaar ku xididdaystay dhaxal-reebkeena Islaamnimo, dhaqankeena, laguna xardhay dastuurkeena. Markaa, kuwa ku gefa mabaadi'da dastuurka, waa dar ku gefey xuquuqdiina oo lumiyey kalsoonidiina. Siyaad Barre xukunka loogama ridin reerkiisa dartii, waxase xukunka looga ridey ku-gefidda uu ku gefey kalsoonidiina darteed. Taliskii Siyaad Barre wuxuu ahaa mid naxariis daran oo dhiigyo-cab ah. Si kastaba ha ahaatee, aakhirkii waad ka gacan-sarrayseen, waayo waad iska diiddeen inaad isu dhiibtaan sharaf-darro iyo xukun caddaalad daran.

Maanta, kalsoonidiinii mar kale ayaa lagu gefey, waxase hubaal ah inaad gacan-sarrayn doontaan mar kale. Indinkoo midhaheeda leh, ayaad xaslateen nabadda, si fiicanna gacan bir ah ugu ilaashateen, laakiin xukuumaddani waxay ku guul-darraysatay inay xushmayso ku-dhaqanka sharciga.

Guddoomiyihii ugu muddada dheeraa ee SNM ahaan, waxaan si toos ah ama dadbanba dul-ka-ilaalin ku soo lahaa istrateejiyado, siyaasado iyo hawl-gallo milateri, kuwaasoo keenay dib-u-dhalashada Somaliland. Guddoomiyaha Xisbiga Kulmiye ahaanna, waxaan ku oggolaaday doorashadii Madaxtooyada kala-horrayn aan sugnayn oo 82 cod ah lexejeclo dalka iyo dadka aan u qabo darteed. Kamay dhicin weli taariikhda Afrikada Saxaaraha ka hoosaysa in doorasho sidaa la isugu dhawyahay ay ku dhammaatoo nabadgelyo iyadoon lagu kala-bixin lana adeegsan gacan-ka-hadal, waxayse beesha caalamku qorteen kuna ammaaneen Xisbiga Kulmiye siiba bislaanshahiisa siyaasadeed.

Xisbiga Kulmiye wuxuu u taagan yahay nabad, midnimo iyo horumar dhinac walba leh, Guddoomiye ahaanna, waxaan halkan idiinku soo gudbinayaa siyaasadahiisa, barnaamijyadiisa iyo qorshayaashiisa uu dalka ku hoggaamin doono. Taageeradiina darteed, waxaanu ku kalsoon nahay inaynnu gacan-sarrayn doonno.

Bayaankani wuxuu u taagan yahay kii koowaad ee tafatiran ee Xisbiga Kulmiye, waxaannuna rumaysannahay inuu si ballaadhan u daboolayo himilooyinka muhiimka ah ee dadka Somaliland. Bayaankani ma aha mid aan wax laga beddeli karin, waayo waxaan hubaa in fikrado iyo aragtiyo cusubi ku soo bixi doonaan wada-tashigeenna iyo wadajir u-tiigsiga yoolalkeenna.

Anigoo ka wakiil ah Xisbiga Kulmiye, waxaan idiin xaqiijinayaa inaannu mar kasta danta guud idiinku ahaan doonno adeegayaal aan is-weyneyn lahayn, oo aanay marnaba naga lumeynin miqyaaska damiirkayagu oo aanaan ku doodi doonin inaanu nahay saadadiina. Ii oggolaada inaan daqiiqaddan u adeegsado is-xusuusinta geesiyaasheenii shahiiday, Allah ha u naxariistee, oo aan idhaahdo tacabkiinnii baannu maalaynnaa idinka dartiin.

Waxaan rajaynayaa in aad tamaraysateen, yididiilana yeelateen, waad mahadsan tihiin.

AXMED MAXAMED SIILAANYO.

GUDDOOMIYAHA XISBIGA KULMIYE

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1. HORDHAC:
   

   Hogaaminta madaxweyne Riyaale ama hoggaamin la'aantiisaba, dalk a waxa isu barkaday dhibaatooyin dhaqaale, siyaasadeed iyo bulsho.

   Dadweynuhu waxay u bukaan isbeddel xukuumadeed, kuwo badan oo dadkaas ka mid ahina waxay rajadooda ku xidhayaan doorashada madaxtooyada ee 2008 ee foolka inagu soo haysa.

   Waxa la joogaa xilligii gaashaanka loo daruuri lahaa maamulkan horumarka fadhiidka ka ah lana dooran lahaa maamul u qalma oo istaahila inuu dalka hoggaamiyo.

   Xisbiga Kulmiye mugdi kagama jiro baaxadda qalalaasaha uu maamulakani dalka u horseeday, taas ayaana ku qasbaysa in Kulmiye dedaalkiisa laban-laabo si uu dadka u baraarujiyo una dareensiiyo dhibaatooyinka soo fool leh, haseyeshee waxa uu wax walba ka fuudhyeelayaa soo bandhigidda iyo qeexidda barnaamij siyaasadeed, dhaqaale iyo bulsho oo tifaftiran, kaas oo ay hagayso aragti iyo ujeeddoyin looga gol- leeyahay in lagu higsado nabad waarta, barwaaqo, dimuqraadiyad iyo istraatijaddii xubin lagaga noqon lahaa Jamciyadda Quruumaha ka dhaxaysa.

1. HIMILADA XISBIGA KULMIYE:

Barnaamijka Xisbiga Kulmiye wuxuu ka turjumayaa xaqiijinta himilooyinka hoos ku xusan?

1. Xisbiga Kulmiye wuxuu u hawl-gelayaa xaqiijinta iyo taabbo-gelinta madax-bannaanida Jamhuuriyadda Somaliland iyo ka mid-noqoshadeeda ururrada caalamiga ah iyadoo ah dawlad la aqoonsan yahay.
2. Xisbiga Kulmiye wuxu higsanayaa inuu dalkan Somaliland ka dhiso bulsho casri ahoo ka xor ah faqriga, jahliga, dulmiga, keli-talisnimda iyo guud ahaan maamul xumada weji kasta oo ay leedahay;
3. Xisbiga Kulmiye wuxu ku naalloonayaa yagleelidda bulsho dimuqraadi ah oo ay saldhig u yihiin mabaadi'da talo-wadaagga ee ka soo jeeda dhaqankeenna suubban,diinteenna Isla a mka ah iyo waayo-aragnimada ina anfacaysa ee aynnu ka soo dheegannay horumarka sayniska iyo teknoolajiyada bulshada caalamku ku tallaabsatay;
4. Xisbiga Kulmiye wuxu ku hammiyayaa abuuridda bulsho nabdoon oo u hiilisa sinnaanta, is-xaqdhawrka iyo nabad-ku-wada-noolaanshaha ummadda Somaliland gaar ahaan iyo dadyawga gobolka iyo adduun-weynaha guud ahaan;
5. Xisbiga Kulmiye wuxuu tiigsanayaa xaqiijinta bulsho ka dhiidhida addoonsiga weji kasta oo uu leeyahay iyo nooc kasta oo gumaysi ah, kana dheeraata yasidda, kala-faquuqidda iyo is-qabyaaladaynta;

1. MEEL-MARINTA XUKUN-WANAAGGA:

Si uu u xaqiijiyo himilooyinka kor ku xusan, Xisbiga Kulmiye wuxuu meel-marinayaa mabaadi'da xukun-wanaagga ee hoos ku qoran?

1. adeegsiga gole xukuumadeed oo kooban, tayana leh iyadoo xeer jideyn doono jiritaanka wasaarad ama hay'ad kasta oo xukuumadeed, xeerkaasoo caddayn doona xilkeeda, qaab-dhismeedkeeda iyo xidhiidhka ay la leedahay hay'adaha kale ee dawladda;
2. hirgelinta hannaanka dimuqraadiga ah si waafaqsan diinta Islaamka iyo dhaqankeena suubban ee Soomaaliyeed iyadoo laga faa'iidaysanayo waayo araganimada waxtarka leh ee dadyawga addu u nka ee arrintaas ka midho dhaliyey;
3. dhiirri-gelinta iyo ka midho-dhalinta nidaamka xisbiyada badan, u-tartanka xorta ah ee hoggaaminta dalka, adkaynta hay'adaha dimuqraadiga iyo ka-qaybgalka dadweynaha ee talada dalka;
4. la-dagaallanka musuqmaasuqa, qaraaba kiilka iyo eexda;
5. xoojinta is-ilaalinta iyo is-dheelli-tirka hay'adaha dawladda (check and balance);
6. meel-marinta madaxbannaynta garsoorka iyo horumarintiisa;
7. dhiirri-gelinta iyo kobcinta saxaafad xor ah;
8. madaxbann a a n ynta iyo horumarinta warbaahinta dawladda, iyadoo la hoos geyn doono komishan madax-bannaan oo dejiya siyaasadda guud ee lagu dhaqayo warbaahinta kuna ilaaliya;
9. abuuridda xafiiska madaxa bannaan ee xadgudub-eegaha (ombudsman) oo awood u leh qabashada cabashooyinka la xidhiidha ku-xadgudubka xuquuqda aasaasiga ah ee qofka, baadhistooda iyo tallaabo-ka-qaadistooda si waafaqsan xeerka;
10. dhawridda xuquuqaha aasaasiga iyo xorriyadaha lagama maarmaanka ah ee habar dad;
11. meel-marinta iyo horumarinta isla-xisaabtanka iyo xalliibnaanta (accountability and transparency);
12. xaqdhawridda iyo horumarinta ku-dhaqanka xeerka (respecting and promoting the rule of law);
13. Horumarinta, xaqdhawridda iyo u-hoggaansanaanta isticmaalka awoodaha cod-bixiyaha iyo cashuur-bixiyaha;
14. abuuridda xafiiska Garyaqaanka Guud ee dawladda;
15. dib-u-habaynta iyo horumarinta xafiiska Xeer-Ilaalinta Guud, boliiska iyo Ciidanka Asluubta iyo ka-ilaalintooda ku-takrifalka awoodda (power abuse);
16. xoojinta iyo horumarinta nidaamka xukun daadejinta (encouragement and development of decentralization);
17. u-kala xaqsooridda gobolada iyo degmooyinka Somaliland iyo isu dheelitirka qaybsiga khayraadka qaranka;
18. dhiirri-gelinta iyo ka qayb gelinta beelaha laga tirade a badan yahay iyo haweenka talada dalka;
19. dhiirri-gelinta wada jirka muwaadiniinta Somaliland iyo u xallinta khilaafaadka si nabddoon;
20. dhiirri-gelinta deris-wanaagga iyo nabad-ku-wada-noolaanshaha dalalka dersika, kuwa mandaqadda iyo beesha caalamka.

1. SIYAASADDA DEBEDDA:

1. UJEEDOOYINKA SALDHIGGA AH EE SIYAASADDA DEBEDDA.Xisbiga Kulmiye wuxu aaminsan yahay in siyaasadda debeddu ay qayb ka tahay siyaasadda qaran ee dalka, sidaas darteedna tahay qayb muhiim ah oo tilmaamaysa danaha iyo ujeedooyinka istraatiijiga ah ee ummadda.Nuxurka siyaasadda debedda ee Somaliland waxay tahay inay caalami ahaan horumariso madaxbanaanida dawladda Somaliland, si loo kasbado ictiraaf waxna ula qabsato beelsha caalamka.

   Waxa xisbiga Kulmiye mudnaanta siinayaa siday Somaliland saaxiibo ugu yeelan lahayd Afrika iyo daafaha kale ee adduunka, sababtoo ah, waxan qiraynaa in masuuliyadda hore loogu riixayo madaxbanaanida dadkeenan u harraadan dimuqraadiyada iyo ka mid noqoshadooda beelsha caalamku ay si aad ah ugu xidhan tahay had a ba sida loo maamulo siyaasdda debedda.

   Waxa xisbiga Kulmiye ku dedaalayaa sidii Somaliland go'doonka looga saari lahaa ayna uga mid noqon lahayd beelsha caalmka. taasi waa ujeeddo muhim ah oo khusaysa siyaasdda debedda waana mid si toos ah uga tarjumaysa boholyawga dadkeenu u hayo dimuqraadiyadda, horumarka iyo aayo-ka-tashiga.

2. MABAADII'DA HAGAYSA ARRIMAHA DEBEDDA:
   1. In siyaasdda Debeddu ahaato mid ka turjumaysa danaha Somaliland
   2. In barwaaqaynta dhaqaale ee Somaliland ku xidhan yahay iskaashi dhaqaale ee heer gobol iyo heer caalami iyo suuqa xorta ah
   3. Inay siyaasaddeena debedda ka muuqato siday inooga go'an tahay inaan dhisno Somaliland dimuqraadi ah
   4. Inaan isku hawllo in xuquuqaha xuquuqaha habar-dad aanay ku koobnaanin siyaasadda, ee ay gaadhaan dhinacayda dhaqaalaha, bulshada iyo deegaanka.
   5. maamulidda xidhiidhada caalamiga ah ee Somaliland waa inay ahaadaan kuwo xalliiban (transparent) waxayna dhacayaan iyadoo lagala tashanayo baarlamaanka
   6. danaha qaranka Somaliland ayaa mar walba hagaya siyaasaddeena Debedda.
   7. ammaanka iyo tayada nolosha dadka Somaliland, sharciga iyo kala danbaynta, nabadda iyo xasiloonida dhaqaale, iyo iskaashiga goboleed ayaa noqonaya mabaadii"da aasaasiga ah ee ay ku dhismayso siyaasadda arrimaha debedda ee Somaliland marka kulmiye qabto majaraha dalka
3. DHIBAATOOYINKA UGU MUHIMSAN EE SIYAASADDA DEBEDDA EE HAYSTA SOMALILAND
   1. Arrinta ictiraafka caalamiga ah ee dawladaha xorta ah laga quud darraynayo.
   2. Xidhiidhka lala yeelanayo Somaliya, kaas oo inta badan ahaa mid ay ku ladhan yihiin turunturooyin, colaad iyo lama filaannaba.
   3. Walaac dhinaca ammaanka ah oo ka dhalshay iska-hor imaadyada riiqda dheeraaday ee ka socda Soomaaliya,
   4. Baadi-goobka xal-u-helidda dhibaatooyinka gudaha ee ka aloosan meelo ka mid ah gobolada Bariga ee Somalailand

1. CADDAALADDA:

Xisbiga kulmiye wuxuu u arkaa in caddaladdu tahay aasaaska nabadda, barwaaqada, midnimada iyo horumarka ummadda. Sidaa darteed, wuxuu ku tallaabsan doonaa sidii caddaaladdu u noqon lahayd mid ummadda wada deeqda.

(b) GARSOORKA:

Xisbiga Kulmiye wuxuu aaminsan yahay in garsoorku yahay halkii sixi lahayd caddaalad darro kasta oo dhacda ama cidi tirsato. Si garsoorku u gudan karo mas'uliyaddaa ahmiyadda weyn leh, waa inuu yahay loona arko inuu yahay mid dhex u ah dhinacyada uu u garnaqayo isla markaana haysta imkaaniyaadka kale ee lagama maarmaanka u ah.

Xisbiga Kulmiye wuxuu u arkaa in garsoorku noqon karo mid dhex u ah dhinacyada uu u gar-naqayo keliya marka uu ka madax-bannaan yahay dhinacyadaa. Sidaa darteed, Xisbigu wuxuu xaqiijin doonaa in garsoorku helo madax-bannaaani dhammays-tiran hay'ad ahaan (institutional independence) iyo garsooreyaal ahaan (individual or decisional independence). Si taas loo suurto-geliyo, Xisbiga Kulmiye wuxuu:

(b) soo-jeedin doonaa in dastuurka lagu sameeyo dib-u-eegis si loo helo wax-ka-beddel dastuur oo garsoorka siiya madax-bannaani dhammays-tiran; madax-bannaanidaas waxa lagu xaqiijin karaa:

i. in maxkamadaha hoose la hoos-geeyo maxkamadda sare si garsoorku u noqdo hay'ad gaar uga taagan waaxda fulinta;
ii. in garsoorku u badax-bannaanaado qorshaynta iyo maamulidda miisaaniyaddiisa lagana fogeeyo waaxda fulinta inay ku yeelato awood ay waxay doonto ugu qori karto ama ugu oggolaan karto;
iii. in Xeer-Ilaalinta Guud laga saaro hay'adda garsoorka;
iv. in dastuurku dammaanad qaado muddo-xileed ay yeeshaan garsoorayaasha maxkamadda sare;
v. in dastuurku dammaanad qaado in Garsoorayaasha la siiyo mushahar, gunno iyo dheef hawl-gabeed oo munaasib ah;
vi. in Golaha Wakiilladu noqdo hay'adda leh oggolaanshaha magacaabista iyo xil-ka-qaadista garsoorayaasha maxkamadda sare, oo helitaanka oggolaanshahaa la'aantii aan Madaxweynuhu qaadi karin tallaabo uu
xil ugu magacaabo ama kaga qaado garsoore maxkamadda sare;
vii. in Guddiga Caddaaladda laga dhigo Komishanka Caddaaladda, lagana feejignaado in waaxda fulintu ay ku yeelato xubin wax ka badan (Agaasimaha Guud ee Wasaaradda Caddaaladda oo keliya tusaale ahaan) iyo in sidoo kale laga feejignaado in xisbiga u bata gole ka mid ah labada gole ee baarlamaanku uu yeelan karo xulista labada xubnood ee uu golahaasi u xulayo Guddiga Caddaaladda, iyadoo arrinta dambe lagu suuro-gelin karo u-qaybinta xubnaha uu soo xulayo gole kastaa laba qaybood oo qaybna soo gudbintooda la siiyo Xisbiga Madaxweynuhu ka soo jeedo qaybta kalena xisbiyada kale.

(t). u hawl-geli doonaa horumarinta garsoorka, iyadoo uu qaadi doono tallaabooyinka hoos ku qoran:

i. kor-u-qaadista aqoonta garsoorayaasha iyo kaaliyayaasha;
ii. ku-fidinta maxkamadaha degmada dhammaan degmooyinka dalka;
iii. kordhinta iyo ballaadhinta hoolalka lagu qaado dacwadaha;
iv. baabi ' inta Guddiyada Nabadgelyada ee jiritaankooda, xeerka ay adeegsadaan, habka ay dacwadda u qaadaan, xukunka ciqaabeed ay ridaan (iyadoo badi xubnahoodu ka soo jeedaan waaxda fulinta) iyo sida kama-dambaysta ah ee ay xukunka u ridaanba uu khilaafsan yahay dastuurka;
v. dib-u-eegidda xeerarka ciqaabta iyo madaniga, iyo xeerarka habka ciqaabta iyo habka madaniga ee dalka iyo dejinta xeerar waafaqsan shareecada Islaamka iyo dastuurka oo uu adeegsado garsoorku, lagalana soo dhex-baxo Shareecad Islaamka, xeer-dhaqameedka ummadda iyo xeerarkii laga dhaxlay gumeysiga ee aan ka hor imanaynnin, Shareecada Islaamka.

(t) XEER-ILAALINTA GUUD:

Xisbiga Kulmiye, isagoo u arka in Xeer-Ilaalinta Guud ahmiyad u leeyahay socodsiinta xeerarka iyo ilaalinta xuquuqaha, wuxuuu ku dadaali doonaa in xafiiskaasi yeesho madax-bannaani uu ku gudan karo xilkiisa oo aanay dhici doonin in lagu sameeyo faro-gelin lagaga ilaaliyo in uu dacwad ku oogo cidda aanay waaxda fulintu dooneynin in dacwad lagu oogo, ama in culays lagu saaro in cid aan dembi gelin uu xafiiskaasi dacwad ku oogo.

(j) CIIDANKA BILEYSKA:

Xisbiga Kulimiye wuxuu aaminsan yahay in Bileysku yahay hay'ad door muhiim ah ku leh xeer-socodsiinta si loo ilaaliyo nabadgelyada iyo xasillonida gudaha. Waxa kale oo Xisbiga Kulmiye aaminsan yahay, in haddii aan bileyska la siin aqoon iyo tababar uu ku guto waajibaadkiisa lana ilaalin hab-dhaqankiisa, uu markaa noqon karo hay'ad aan gudan waxa ay u taagan tahay haddaanay noqonba mid waxyeello weyn ku leh bulshada. Sidaa darteed, Xisbiga Kulmiye wuxuu mudnaan siin doonaa dib-u-habayn lagu sameeyo Bileyska.

AMMAANKA QARANKA.

1. MABAADII'DA GUUD.

Arrimaha ammaanka qaranka waa inay ka ballaadhaan daabaceedda ciidan milateri balse ay yeeshaan dhinacayadooda dhaqaale, caafimaad, barasho, diineed iyo fayo-dhawr deegaaneed bad iyo berriba. Ammaanka qaranka waxa soo gelaya wax kasta oo wax-yeellayn kara muwaadinka Somaliland.

Kulmiye wuxuu ahmiyad siinayaa arrimaha ammaanka qaranka, ilaalinta iyo daryeelidda nabadgelyada muwaadiniinta, gaar ahaan arrimaha saamaynta xun ku leh caafimaadka muwaadiniinta, qiyamka, diinta, waxbarashada iyo guud ahaan suubbanaanta shacbiga.

Kulmiye wuxuu aaminsan yahay, iyadoo ay ugu wacan tahay adduunkii oo edeg ku wada-jira, isa saamayntiisuna ay maalinba maalinta ka danbaysa soo kordhayso, ayaa waxa lagama maarmaan ah in feejigo la yeesho, iyadoo wixii wanaagsan laga faai'daysanayo, la iskana caabbiyayo wixii dhibaato u leh dhaqanka, diinta, caafimaadka, barbaarinta iyo koboca shakhsiyadda qofka .

Si uu arrimahaas u xaqiijiyo, Kulmiye wuxu yeelanayaa siyaasad dhammays-tiran oo uu ku waajaho wixii khuseeya ammaanka qaranka. Sidaa darteed, Kulmiye wuxuu dejinayaa, horena u- marinayaa siyaasad dhinacyo badan leh oo ku wajahan ilaalinta ammaanka qaranka.

1. DIFAACA QARANKA IYO SUGIDDA XUDUUDAHA

(b) CIIDANKA MILLATERIGA:

Xisbiga Kulmiye wuxuu aaminsan yahay in ciidan milateri ah oo adag oo dalkani yeeshaa u yahay cunsur aasaasi ah xaqiijinta gooni-isu-taagga iyo madax-bannaanidiisa. Sidaa darteed. waxa Xisbigu ku talo-jiraa dhisidda ciidan milateri ah oo tayo sare leh kuna fillaada difaaca dalka iyo ilaalintiisa. Si taas loo suurto-geliyo, Xisbigu wuxuu ku tallaabsan doonaa:

1. in uu isagoo ka duulaya khataraha hor-yaalla, qorsheeyo tirada ciidan ee lagaga hor-tegi karo, tayada uu u baahan yahay (tababar, hub iyo qalabba) iyo sida loogu heli karo;
2. in ciidanka hadda jira (ee aan magac u gaar ah, dhisme ciidan iyo darajadii kala sarrayneed ee aasaaska u ahayd kala dambaynta lagama-maarmaanka u ah ciidan milateri) uu ku sameeyo dib-u-habayn meesha ka saarta dhammaan dhalliilahaas iyo kuwa kale ee jiraba;
3. in dadka aan wax-tarka u lahayn ciidanka si habboon loo dhimo, sida ku wareejintooda mashaariicda horumarineed ee shaqo-abuurka ah;
4. soo saaridda saraakiil dhallinyaro ah oo hoggaamisa hurimaha iyo ururrada ciidanka iyadoo fiiro gaar ah la siin doono dhallinyaradii jabhaddii SNM ee waayo-aragnimada dagaal yeelatay.

1. KOBCINTA DHAQAALAHA IYO LA-DAGAALLANKA SABOOLNIMADA:

Xisbiga Kulmiye wuxuu u arkaa in faqrigu yahay masiibo culus oo Ilaahay laga magan-galo, haddaanay ummaddu u guntan inay wax qabsato oo aanay wajihin inay mushkiladdaa isku-duubni kaga baxdana aanay jireyn cid kale oo ka saari kartaa. Sidaa darteed, Xisbiga Kulmiye wuxuu ku dedaali doonaa inuu abaabulo ummadda una kala jaheeyo ilaha dhaqaale ee dalka, talo, tusaale iyo maalgelin wixii uu u heli karo ama u raadin karana aanu ka hagran doonin.

(b) XOOLAHA NOOL:

Xisbiga Kulmiye isagoo ka duulaya in xoola-dhaqashadu horena u ahayd laf-dhabarka dhaqaalaha dalka, waqtiyada soo socdana ahaan doonto wax-soo-saarka koowaad ee nolosha dadweynaha badankiisu ku tiirsan tahay, tahayna ilaha ugu weyn ee lacagta adagi ka soo hoyan karto ayaa waxa xisbigu mudnaanta kowaad siinayaa kobcinta docda (sektarka) xoolaha, daryeelka deegaanka xooluhu ku sugan yihiin iyo horumarinta xoola-dhaqatada isagoo ku tallaabasanaya arrimaha soo socda:

1. daryeelka caafimaadka xoolaha;
2. daryeelka dhul daaqsimeedka;
3. dhiirri-gelinta dhoofka xoolaha;
4. helidda iyo horumarinta habab cusub oo looga faaii'daysto cadka iyo caanaha xoolaha;
5. samaynta wershado lagu farsameeyo walxaha xoolaha ka soo jeeda sida cadka, caanaha, hargaha, dhogorta iyo lafaha;
6. curinta habab cusub oo loo dhaqo xoolaha;
7. maaraynta isbeddelada aan qorshaysnayn ee ku socda hanaankii soo jireenka ahaa ee xoolo-dhaqasho ee ku dhisnaa guur-guurka xorta ah;
8. soo noolaynta seera-daaqsimeedyadii;
9. helidda ilo tamareed (source of energy) si loo badbaadiyo deegaanka;
10. qabashada biyo roobaadka (samaynta harooyin iyo biyo-xidheenno);
11. hakinta biyaha iyo joojinta boholaha/jeex-jeexyada);
12. hakinta qulqulka ay dhallinyarada miyigu ku soo gelayaan magaalooyinka;
13. ku tallaabsiga cilmibaadhisyo ku wajahan daraasadda hanaanka xoola-dhaqasho;
14. samaynta machadyo lagu barto dhinacyada kala duwan ee cilmiga xoolaha.

(t) DALAGGA BEERAHA:

Beeruhu waa wax-soo-saarka labaad ee dalka Soomaliland, waxaana ka mid ah Beeyada, faleenka, malmalka iyo xabkaha kale ee dalka Somaliland caanka ku yahay. Kulmiye wuxuu ogsoon yahay in Somaliland tahay meelaha dhifka ah ee adduunka xabkaha kala duwan laga helo, waxa kale oo Kulmiye ogyahay in haddii khayraadkaas dabiiciga ah si wanaagsan loo maamulo uu wax weyn ka tari karo horumarinta dhaqaalaha dalka. Sidaas daraadeed, si looga midho-dhaliyo arrintaas loona gaadho isku filaansho dhinaca wax-soo-saarka beeraha ah, Xisbiga Kulmiye wuxuu ku tallabsanayaa:

1. Dhiirri-gelinta wax-soo-saarka beeraha, beer roobaadyada iyo beer waraabyadaba, iyo baridda beeraleyda dalagga ku habboon cimilada dalkan;
2. siinta beeralayda qalabka iyo khibradda ay u baahan tahay;
3. kobcinta, xannaanaynta iyo dersidda dhirta ay faleenka iyo xabkaha kale ka baxaan;
4. taageeridda dadka ka shaqaysta faleenka sida siinta deyn maaliyadeed;
5. dhiirri-gelinta ururro iyo iskaashatooyin ay isugu tagaan beeraleydu;
6. suuq-u-raadinta xabkaha kala duwan ee dalka ka baxa;
7. dhiirri-gelinta samaynta wershado yar-yar oo miira saliidaha midhaha iyo xabkaha iyo kuwo qasacadeeya khudaarta iyo suuq u raadintooda ;
8. dhiirri-gelinta dhismaha bakhaarrada wax qaboojiya si loogu kaydiyo khudaarta iyo cuntooyinka kala ee dhakhso u xumaada.
9. abuuridda machadka beeraha iyo deraasaadka dhirta.

(j) GANACSIGA:

Xisbiga Kulmiye isagoo ka dhaqaaqaya dareenka ah in bulshada reer Somaliland tahay bulsho u jajaban ganacsiga iyo wax is dhaafsiga ayaa wuxu ku tallaabsanayaa:

1. dhiirri-gelinta ganacsi ku fadhiya suuqa xorta ah;
2. awoodsiinta rug ganacsi oo uruurisa una sahan tagta ganacsatada reer Somaliland;
3. u-hawl-gelidda sidii Somaliland u noqon lahayd albaabkii iyo biriijkii Geeska Afrika ku xidhayey dunida inteeda kale;
4. soo jiidashada maalgashiga shisheeye.
5. horumarinta adeegyada aasaasiga ah sida waddooyinka, isgaadhsiinta (basic infrastructure);
6. ballaadhinta iyo casriyeynta dekedda Berbera si ay ula beretanto dekedaha ka jira mandaqadda iyo horumarinta dekedaha yar yar ee kale ee dalka;
7. dhiirri-gelinta abuuritaanka baanan ganacsi oo gaar loo leeyahay iyo kuwo wadaag ahba;
8. abuuridda kulliyado laga barto aqoonta casriga ah ee ganacsi ee ku xidhiidhsan internetka (e commerce).

(x) DHIIRRI-GELINTA KA FAAI'IDAYSIGA KHAYRAADKA KALE:

Waxa xisbiga Kulmiye diiradda saarayaa ka faa'iidaysiga iyo abuuridda ilo cusub oo dhaqaale kuwaas oo ay ugu horeeyaan:

1. ilaalinta, dhawrista iyo si san uga faaii'daysiga khayraadka badda;
2. sahaminta macdanta iyo shidaalka;
3. sahaminta khayraadka biyaha, qabashada biyo roobaadka, samaynta biyo-xidheeno, harooyin iyo balliyo.

IX. LA-DAGAALLANKA SHAQO LA'AANTA :

Xisbiga Kulmiye wuxu ku dedaalayaa inuu shaqo u abuuro dhallinyarada camal la'aantu ragaadisay isagoo ku tallaabsanayaa arrimaha so socda:

1. abuuridda mashaariic horumarineed oo dad badan mashquulin kara, gaar ahaan kuwa aan khibradda lahayn (labor intensive projects) sida dhiraynta, waddooyinka, dhaamamka, iyo biyo-xidheennada;
2. u-samaynta xirfado shaqo dhallinyarada aan wax barashada fursad u helin, u-jahayntooda ilo dhaqaale sida kallumaysiga, beeraha, xoolaha iwm;
3. gacan-qabashada ganacsatada yaryar iyadoo loo fidinayo deyn heerkooda la jaan-qaadda.

X. LA-DAGAALLANKA MUSUQMAASUQA:

Xisbiga Kulmiye waxay ugu muuqataa in musuqmaasuqu yahay cunsur qayb weyn ku leh ragaadinta dhaqaalaha ummadaha, sababana dib-u-dhaca ku yimaadda. Sidaa darteed, si loo xakameeyo musuqmaasuqa barriinsaday dalkeenan curdinka ah, waxa Xisbiga Kulmiye ku tallaabsanayaa:

1. hawlgelinta shaqaale dawladeed oo ku salaysan tirada iyo tayada shaqo waliba u baahan tahay, loona qoondeeyo mushahar iyo gunnooyin dabooli kara baahiyaha qofka caadiga ah ee heerarka kala duwan ee shaqaale waxna uga dhigmi karaan, iyo weliba dheef hawlgabeed oo munaasib ah oo qofka shaqaalaha ahi ku talogalo inuu xaqiiqa ahaan yeelanayo ka dib markuu shaqeeyo muddo go'an;
2. habsami-u-dhimidda shaqaalaha dheeraadka ku ah shaqaalaha dawladda, iyadoo la siin doono shaqaalaha la dhimayo xuquuqdooda muddadii ay shaqaynayeen;
3. dejinta siyaasad maaliyadeed oo lagu xakameeyo musuqmaasuqa oo fulinteedu ka timaaddo kor ila hoos;
4. dejinta nidaam maaliyadeed oo lagu ogaan karo xatooyada iyo wax-is-weydaarinta, heer kasta oo shaqo, laga bilaabo madaxtooyada ilaa heerka ugu hooseeya ee wax-soo-saar ama isticmaal hanti ummadeed;
5. dejinta xeerka la dagaallanka musuqmaasuqa oo suurto-geliya in la baadho dembi lagu oogo, cidda lagu helena xabsi dheer looga heli karo iyo dib-u-soo celin hantida ku maqnaata sida la- wareegid hantida uu ka meelaystay shaqada ama horeba uu u lahaa si looga gooyo hantida ku maqnaata;
6. baadhidda hantidii laga meelaystay ummadda laga soo bilaabo dib-ula-soo noqoshadii dawladnimada ee may, 1991, dib-u-soo celinteeda iyo maxkamadaynta ciddii kasta ee fal noocaas ah ku kacday;
7. u-madax-bannaynta gudashada xilkiisa xafiiska Hantidhawraha Guud iyo horumarintiisa.

XI. LA DAGAALLANKA AQOONDARRIDA :

Xisbiga Kulmiye, isagoo ogsoon in aqoon-darradu tahay hoyga dhaqaale-xumada iyo caafimaad-darrada, wuxuu dejin doonaa siyaasad waxbarasho oo higsata in ilaa dugsiyada sare lacag-la'aan yihiin. Siyaasadda waxbarasho waxay noqon doontaa mid ilaalisa tayada waxbarashada dawladda iyo ta gaarka ahba. Xisbigu waxa kale oo uu ka war-hayaa in duruufihii dadkani soo maray dartood dad badani xilli-dugsiyeedkoodii ay ku waxbarasho waayeen. Sidaa darteed, Xisbigu wuxuu xoogga saarayaa:

1. abuuridda iyo kobciinta dugsiyo xirfadeed iyadoo mudnaanta la siinayo dhalinyarada aan helin waxbarashadii caadiga ahayd;
2. xoojinta wabarasho ku jihaysan wax-soo-saarka iyo deegaanka dalka
3. soo noolaynta iyo ballaadhinta iskuulladii jiifka iyo cuntada lahaa.
4. ka-faaii'daysiga hababka waxbarsho ee casriga ah ee ay suura-gelinayaan horumarka teknoolajiyada iyo isgaadhsiinta casriga ahi;
5. siinta fiiro gaar ah waxbarashada dadka waaweyn, gaar ahaan haweenka.

XII. DARYEELKA DHALLINYARADA:

Si dhallinyarada looga badbaadiyo dhaqammada lidka ku ah horumarka bulshada, Xisbiga Kulmiye wuxuu ahmiyad siinayaa:

1. la-dagaallanka mukhaadaraadka sida xashiishadda, xabag iyo batrool-nuugidda, qaadka sigaarka, derbi-jiifka IWM;
2. dhiirri-gelinta isboortiga iyo ciyaaraha;
3. dhisidda garoomo lagu ciyaaro isboortiga;
4. furidda maktabado;
5. dhiirri-gelinta waxbarashada guud ahaan.

XIII. XOOJINTA BARASHADA IYO KU-DHAQANKA DIINTA ISLAAMKA:

Maadaama ummadda Somaliland tahay 100% muslim, Xisbiga Kulmiye wuxuu xoogga saarayaa:

1. xoojinta waxbarashada diiniga ah, gaar ahaan malcaamadaha quraanka;
2. tababarida macallimiinta;
3. hagaajinta iyo maal-glinta dugsiyada quraanka lagu barto;
4. daabacadda iyo badinta kutubta diinta laga barto;
5. u-aqoonsiga malcaamadaha in ay yihiin bilowgii akhris-qorista.
6. samaynta guddi culimo oo noqota marjaca diinta si looga dheeraado khilaafaadka diiniga ah.

XIV. SIYAASADDA XISBIGA EE DADKA LA HAYB-SOOCO.

Siyaabo farabadan ayaa loo takooraa dadka la hayb-sooco. Iyadoo ay ugu wacan tahay xaaladooda bulsho iyo dhaqaale, waxa laga duudsiyey ka qaybgalka dhaqaale, waxbarasho iyo siyaasadeed.

Xisbiga Kulmiye waxa ka go'an tirtiridda nooc kasta oo takoor ah, gaar ahaan, kan ku salaysan hayb-sooca. Kulmiye wuxu aqoonsanyahay in dadka la hayb-soocaa ay dulman yihiin, sidaas daraadeed, waxa ka go'an inuu dadkaas ka awood-siiyo dhinacyada dhaqaalaha, waxabarashada, iyo siyaasadda.

Kulmiye wuxu aaminsan yahay in awoodsiinta noocaas ahi ay muftaax u tahay wax ka qabashada takoorka dhaqanka ka soo jeeda iyo la dagaalanka macaamilka xun ee lagu hayo qayb bulshada ka mid ah.

Si dadka la hayb sooco loogu soo celiyo xurmadoodii bin'aadminimo, iyadoo hoos loogu daadegaayo nuxurka dhibaatada, xisbiga Kulmiye wuxu qaadayaa tallaabooyinka soo socda:

1. In xeer ahaan loo qoondeeyo tiro kuraas ah ee wakiilnimada siyaasadeed heer deegaan iyo heer qaran.
2. In dhiirrigelin iyo tixgelin loo siiyo dhinac-yada waxbarashada iyo shaqada dawladda.
3. In la meel mariyo siyaasado iyo shuruuc lagula dagaalamayo cudurkan bulsho, laguna joojinayo takoorka haybta ku dhisan, xeerar adagna laga soo saaro.
4. In saraakiisha dawladda iyo sharci fulinta lagu wacyi- geliyo dacdarrada Kooxaha laga Tirada badan yahay, sidaas daraadeed, la diiwaan geliyo lana baadho xadgudbayada ku xidhiidhsan haybsooca iyo gefafka laga galo Dadka laga Tirada badan yahay
5. In la abuuro barnaamijyo gaar ah oo loo habeeyey tababaridda Dadka laga Tirada badan yahay gaar ahaan xirfad siintooda
6. In loo abuuro fursado ay ku qaataan deyn fudud si kor loogu qaado ganacsiga yar yar ee ay ku hawlan yihiin.

XV. ARRIMAHA HAWEENKA

Xisbiga Kulmiye waxa ka go'an inuu hubiyo in haweenku si buuxda oo firfircoon oo xaq-soor leh uga qayb qaataan dhammaan dhinacyada bulshada, siyaasadda, iyo dhaqaalaha ee dhismaha nololsha, iyadoo la abuurayo quwad shaqaysa oo mut oo aqoon leh, taas oo awood u leh ka-qayb qaadashada hawlaha dawadda.

Kulmiye wuxu suurtagelinayaa nidaam ku dhisan xaqsoor kuna wajahan ka qaybgal buuxa oo haweenka docaha soo socda:

b) QAYBTA DAWLADDA.

1. U qoondaynta tiro macquul ah oo haween ah inay siyaasad dejiye (policy makers) ka noqdaan dawladda dhexe iyo tan hooseba gaar ahaan golaha xukuumada, wakiilada iyo golayaalsha deegaanka.
2. In haweenka la awoodsiiyo iyadoo loo marayo hanaanka doorashada iyo magacaabiddaba si ay u noqdaan (maayaro, guddoomiyeyaal xaafadeed, maamulayaal dugsi) iwm.
3. In haweenka loo suurtageliyo si ay kaalin hoggaamineed uga noqdaan mansabyo sarsarena uga qabtaan hay'adaha

t) QAYBTA MIYIGA.

Madaama in badan oo haweenka ahi yihiin kuwa quud maalmeedka qoyska soo kasbada, Kulmiye wuxu taageerayaa horumarinta haweenka reer miyiga ah isagoo ka suuragelinaya in waaxda beeruhu abuurto xafiisyo fidineed oo fuliya siyaabaha lagu gaadhayo isku filaanshaha cuntada.

• In beeralayda saboolka ah la baro hababka kaydinta kala duwan ee cuntada iyo khudaarta;
• Horumarinta ilaha biyaha iyadoo maskaxda lagu hayo in haweenku yihiin kuwa qoysaska biyaha u dhaamiya.
• In la sameeyo awoodo ay wadaagaan waaxyaha caafimaadka, waxbarashada iyo dhaqaaluhu, taasoo looga jeedo in la dejiyo hababkii loo hormarin lahaa loona fidin lahaaa adeegyo caafimaad sida baro caafimaad oo wareega (mobile clinics) lana abuuro barnaamijyo idaacadda ka baxa oo ka hadlaya faya dhawrka, nadaafadda iyo arrimaha hooyanimada.
• In la hagaajiyo tayada nolosha dadweynaha iyadoo la dhisayo baro caafimaad oo bixiya adeegayada aasaasiga ah
• In la tababaro farsamayaqaano, shaqaale caafimaad sida umulisooyin, kalkaalisooyin, kuwa nafaqada wax ka yaqaan (nutritionists) oo ka hawlgala baraha caafimaad

XVI. WARBAAHINTA

Warbaahin madaxbanaan oo firfircooni waxay muhim u tahay tisqaadka qaranimada iyo maamul wanaagga. Marka aanay jirin warbaahin madaxbanaan oo looga qaateen ah oo si joogto ah u ilaalinaysa hab dhaqanka saraakiisha dawladda iyo siday u maaraynayaan khayraadka, muwaadiniintu waxay ahaadaan kuwo ka xidhiidh furtay oo aan si dhab ahna uga qayb qaadan dejinta siyaasadda dalka iyo mashaariicda xukuumaddu fulinayso.

Meel marinta arrimaha soo socda ayaa warbaahinta u suurtagelinaya inay gaadho waajibaadkeeda:

• In la meel mariyo xeerka saxaafadda ee lam, 27/2004 ee ku salaysan qodobka 32 ee dastuurka
• In la abuuro Hay'adda Qaranka Warbaahinta (Public Broadcasting Corporation) oo hoos imanaysa guddi madaxbanaan
• In si degdeg ah xayiraadda aan dastuuriga ahayn looga qaado furashada idaacado gaar loo leeyahay iyo nooc kastoo warbaahin ah
• In lagu tallaabasdo kor u qaadidda tayada warbaahinta
• In la sameeyo xeerka anshax ku dhaqanka warbaahinta

XVII. QURBA-JOOGGA

Waaya aragnimada caalamka waxa laga dheehan karaa kaalinta wax-ku-oolka ah ee Qurbajoogga kala duwani ka ciyaareen dib-u-dhiska dalakii ay ka markii hore ka soo jeedeen. Qurbajoogga reer Somaliland na kama duwan dhiggiisa. Haddaba si looga faaii'daysto awoodaha xadiga badan ee qurbajoogga, dhaqaalahooda iyo khibradoodaba, xisbiga Kulmiye wuxu ku tallaabsanayaa arrimaha soo socda:

1. In la sameeyo xafiis xidhiidhiya arrimaha Qurbajoogga oo hoos yimaadda Madaxweyne ku Xigeenka
2. In la dhiirigeliyo kooxaha kala duwan ee Qurbajoogga inay is abaabulaan si ay u yeeshaan wakiillo u fududeeya inay si micno leh uga qayb qaataan arrimaha ka socda dalka hooyo si ay saamayn wax-ku-ool ah ugu yeeshaan jihada ay qaadanayso barnaamijyada qaran ee horumarineed
3. In la abuuro kayd xogeed qaran (national data base) oo ay ku urrurto khibradaha mihaniga ah ee Qurbajoogga taas oo looga dan leeyahay in danaha qaran looga faai'idaysan karo halkii iyo goortii ay ku habboon tahay.
4. In wasaaradda qorshayntu diyaariso fulisona siyaasado gaar ah oo ku wajahan kor u qaadidda iyo dhiirigelinta hay'adaha deeqda bixiya inay ka faaii'daystaan xogta ku ku urursan kayd-xogeedka qaran, si ay u ogaadaan muwaadiniinta ay shaqaalaysan karaan, waxna kala qaban kara hawlahooda
5. Abuuridda ilo rasmi ah oo ay dadka qurbajoogga ahi ka heli karaan xogaha ay u baahan yihiin ee wax ka taraya dedaallada horumarineed iyo dhadhaqaaqa bulsho ee ka socda dalka hooyo;
6. In Qurbajoogga dalka imanaya loo fidiyo adeeg wacan oo soo dhowayneed.

XVIII. CAAFIMAADKA:

Xisbiga Kulmiye, isagoo ogsoon in caafimaadku yahay aasaaska nolosha wax-qabsiga iyo farxadda leh ee qofka iyo horumarka bulshada, wuxuu xoogga saarayaa:

1. in la sugo fayo-qabka guud ee bulshada (general hygiene) ee la xidhiidha bilicda guud ee deegaan, isticmaalka biyo nadiif ah, xakamaynta cudurrada faafa iyo adeega guud ee caafimaadka;
2. in dhamaan dalka laga cidhib tiro cudurrada ragaadiyey bulshadeena sida TB, iyo Duumada, isla markaana la xakameeyo fiditaanka HIV, iwm;
3. in la horumariyo goobaha caafimaadka, cusbitaallada, MCHyada iyo PHC-yaduna ay noqdaan qaar lagu aammini karo caafimaadka bulshada;
4. in la kantaroolo adeegyada caafimaadka ee gaarka ah;
5. in la baadho isla markaana la ilaaliyo tayada dawooyinka dalka imanaysa;
6. in la helo shaybaadho iyo machadyo lagu barto caafimaadka;
7. in la abuuro kulliyado caafimaad oo laga helo dhakhaatiir tayo leh.

XIX. DAAWEYNTA IYO DARYEELIDDA NAAFADA JIDH AHAANEED

IYO MASKAX AHAANEED:

Xisbiga Kulmiye wuxuu wax ka qabanayaa tabaalada haysata dadka burburkii dhibaatooyinku ka soo gaadheen isagoo ku dedaalaya:

1) inuu wax ka qabto naafada argagaxa leh iyo kuwa silsiladaha ku dabran ee guri kasta oo Somaliland ah ku sugan;
2) inuu sameeyo goobo lagu xannaaneeyo dadka maskaxda wax ka qaba;
3) in la uruuriyo dadka maskaxda wax ka qaba ee suuqyada ku filiqsan, dhaxanta iyo bacadkana gaaf wareegaya iyo kuwa guryaha ku xidhan loona helo daaweyn iyo xannaanayn lacag la'aan ah.

XX. KOBCINTA HIDDAHA IYO DHAQANKA IYO QAYBAHA KALA DUWAN EE SUUGAANTA:

Xisbiga Kulmiye wuxuu ku taamayaa inuu soo celiyo hankii, karaamadii iyo isku-kalsoonaantii qofka Soomaaliga ah oo muddo badan ku jiray qaxooti, walbahaar iyo dagaallo sokeeye.

Siyaabaha arrimahaa wax lagaga qaban karaa waxa ka mid ah:

horumarinta fanka iyo suugaanta iyadoo la abuurayo hoy-dhaqameedyo sida masraxyo, muuseemyo, dugsiyo lagu barto muusikada iyo farshaxanka Soomaliyeed, ciyaaraha, horumarinta far Soomaaliga, bug-qoraalka iyo daraasadda iyo uruurinta hiddaha iyo dhaqanka aan qornayn.

XXI. QORRIDDA SOOYAALKA TAARIIKHEED EE HALGANKII DIB U XORAYNTA IYO DIB-U-HESHISIINTII BEELAHA SOMALILAND:

Xisbiga Kulmiye wuxuu culays saarayaa qoridda iyo uruurinta sooyaalka taariikheed ee halgankii dib u xoraynta ee ay hormoodka ka ahayd SNM, la soo noqoshadii xornimada iyo yagleeliddii iyo xaqiijinta qaranka Somaliland. Si taas loo suurto-geliyo, Xisbiga Kulmiye wuxuu meel marinayaa:

1. qorridda taariikhdii wax-iska-caabinta;
2. qoridda xasuuqii dadka reer waqooyiga iyo dumintii magaalooyinka;
3. qoridda la-soo-noqoshadii madaxbanaanida;
4. qoridda dib-u-yagleeliddii Somaliland.

ALLAA MAHAD LEH.

SOPRI
2nd Somaliland Convention
‘The Governance and Economic Development of Somaliland’
8- 10th September 2006
Washington D.C., USA

Thoughts on elections and post-elections:
a Somaliland/ UK civil society perspective.

Steve Kibble/Adan Yusuf Abokor
Progressio.
London/ Hargeisa.

31st August 2006
Contents:

Introduction …………………….. P3.

Events to the South …………….P4.

Paths to Democracy ……………P5

Parliamentary Elections ………..P5

Post-election Challenges ………P7

International Support and role ….P9

Conclusion ……………………….P10



Summary:
This paper examines the parliamentary election of 2005 and its aftermath from the perspective of civil society activists working in Somaliland and in international advocacy on Somaliland for Progressio (which has worked in the country for over a decade). It looks at the opportunities created by the path to democratisation in a society changing from a hybrid ‘traditional’ form towards a more formal Western-type democracy. Within the regional context of events in (South) Somalia, the paper calls for sensitive and collaborative outside interventions, and for the momentum to democratisation not to be derailed by external events. It makes some suggestions for the form such interventions might take.

Whilst we work for Progressio, this paper is a contribution to debate rather than a final position statement of our organisation.

Steve Kibble is also a spokesperson for Somaliland Focus (UK). Details of its work can be found at http://www.somalilandfocus.org/uk
Thoughts on elections and post-elections:
a Somaliland/ UK civil society perspective.
Steve Kibble/Adan Yusuf Abokor
Progressio[1].

‘Something is wrong. In Somalia you just need to kill 100 people to be recognised by the international community as a ‘player’. But you do not get any recognition if several thousand people vote for you here [in Somaliland] ‘ – 2005 election candidate interviewed by Mark Bradbury quoted in Abokor and Kibble (2006) Further Steps to Democracy: The Somaliland Parliamentary elections, September 2005. Progressio, London.

Introduction
This paper’s focus is the parliamentary elections of 2005 and an assessment of what progress has been made nearly a year later. This is against the background of how outside assistance (especially non governmental) has helped (or possibly hindered) Somaliland’s progress to democracy and reconstruction. It stresses that whilst the external environment is not helpful at the moment towards Somaliland (SL), both Somalilanders and outside friends inside and outside the diaspora need to keep the momentum towards democratisation. There is need for a sustained commitment and interventions by key actors who know each others functions, approaches, methods of assessing impact and the like. A multi-track approach to peace and stability in the wider Somali region is vital.

We enter a plea for a greater historical understanding since many outside interventions, colonial and post-colonial, have been based on misunderstandings of Somalia/land and Somali culture and ‘tradition’. Has Somaliland or the region yet completely come to terms with the way that a decentralised [for men] egalitarian clan-based system came into unequal contact with a modernist centralised colonial system? Three historical eras followed this collision – all marked by violence. We can see how the path to democratisation has attempted to reverse this process, whilst external factors reinforce it.

Somaliland might be said to be poised between ‘traditional’ structures arising from clan society and the ideas emanating from civil society (often influenced by time spent in the diaspora[2]) on more Western forms of democratisation. In terms of post-election assessment it is useful to ask who negotiates this exchange? It seems as though some key actors are beginning to move the hybrid form along to reflect more clearly the developing Somaliland – women’s groups, civil society[3], urban youth, some of the business sector. How the more traditional elements exemplified perhaps by the ruling party UDUB[4] and a number of clan leaders (and men in general?) react to such movement will reflect the Somaliland post-election path. However we should also be aware that this is unlikely to be a linear path or indeed take the form of binary opposition between ‘so-called progress’ and ‘tradition’. We are trying to avoid the trap here, common to much outside comment of an over-reliance on fairly simple opposites/ binaries such as clan v religion, moderate v fundamentalist, modern v traditionalist, monolithic Somali bloc versus monolithic Somaliland one, Islamists v warlords, Christian v Muslim and the like.

Somaliland’s declaration that its union with Somalia had finished given the lack of a viable state in the south occurred within the second wave of democratisation in the early 1990s; as Mark Bradbury has proposed, it arguably it had more success in legitimating the state in the eyes of its citizens at least because it was based on well understood and historically strong foundations that neither colonialism nor ‘scientific socialism’ were able to wipe out – in essence a social contract which regulates political and economic relationships between pastoral kinship groups rather than delegating responsibility to a central government. Somaliland’s recent history of conflict resolution has involved a bottom-up approach to building societies from local communities upwards, gradually widening the arena of political agreement and political consensus. According to Ioan Lewis, this method of widening political consensus works when societies are as in the Somali case, highly fragmented and decentralised, and do not conform to assumptions about the universality of civil society and Western multiparty democracy. How does outside assistance sensitively deal with such a (changing) process?

What are the current challenges facing Somaliland in terms of development and democracy?
Where are we nearly a year after the parliamentary elections?
Is there movement on greater representation for women?
In what particular areas are Somalilanders themselves looking for change (and outside assistance)?
What practical steps in democratisation can outsiders help with?
What are they already doing?
Are the key areas the effective role of political parties, human rights training, media freedom issues, equality of gender representation etc?

Events to the South
Regionally, we appear to be in a delicately balanced situation for Somaliland. Part of the ‘international community’ was seemingly about to line up behind the African Union (AU) as it looked at the case for recognition, but now the ‘Islamist threat’ threatens to put Somaliland on the back burner[5]. Equally Somali ‘radicals’ and ‘moderates’ alike reject either independence or federal solutions for Somaliland. Our concern is over how far a destabilising external context derails the democratisation process internally, with the danger of those in the SL state apparatus with a Siad Barre legacy lapsing into what they have known in the past of anti-democratic practices, executive diktat etc. There are also worries that Somaliland’s native extremists are getting stronger eg in Burco and that Islamist anti-foreigner rhetoric has resonance inside the country. Do Somalilanders including the young see the government doing enough for the country? There is need here to avoid an external and internal alliance of extreme political Islamists – in Somaliland as well as Somalia – by having a conversation with ‘moderate conservative’ Islamists who have similar views to the political Islamists but who are opposed to violence. It is unfortunate that whilst Somaliland’s people have been closely observing the situation (and are concerned about effects on Mogadishu’s civil society[6] and the position of women there) neither house of parliament has looked at either the events to the south or the effect on Ethiopian- Somaliland relations – leaving it to the opposition parties. However in terms of the wider regional context we leave it to other papers.

Paths to Democracy
The proclamation of independence in 1991 following the collapse of the unitary Somali state meant that the new Somaliland state had the opportunity to break with former corrupt, military and unrepresentative forms of government. The lack of formal international recognition for Somaliland has its costs. Without it the country does not qualify for bilateral donor assistance or the support of international financial institutions for reconstruction. Lack of recognition has discouraged foreign investments and constricts trading practices. The meagre international assistance received, however, has meant that reconstruction has been largely achieved from the resources and resourcefulness of Somalilanders themselves. The main source of finance has been remittances from the Somalis living abroad. Since 1998 these have replaced the income from livestock exports as the mainstay of the economy. Lack of recognition also meant that Somalilanders had the opportunity to build their own system tailored to their needs. For the first twelve years this was a hybrid system combining traditional institutions of clan governance (or male pastoral democracy) with formal Western-style government institutions.

The government has signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; overseen the restoration of peace; demobilised former combatants; brought about social and economic rehabilitation and overseen the drafting of a constitution based on universal suffrage, decentralisation and multi‑partyism. There is a war crimes commission looking into the human rights abuses of the Siad Barre years. There is a reasonably high level of personal security for citizens. However, apart from its economic viability, Somaliland’s prospects also depend on the viability of its current political order.

The recognition issue is a key litmus test for Somalilanders. In 1999, the then President Egal argued that democratisation would facilitate international recognition of Somaliland. In May 1999, the Hargeisa government approved a plan to move from the clan-based system to a multi-party political system –providing the proposed parties were not based on tribal or religious lines and drew support from all regions. There were to be votes for women, although no women were actually consulted in drawing up the draft. In 2001 a referendum on the new constitution was conducted in Somaliland. In Dec 2002 and April 2003, the local government district councils and the presidential elections were held respectively in a reasonably free and fair manner as commented on by international observers such as my own institute[7].

Parliamentary elections of 2005
In 2005 CIIR was officially requested by the National Electoral Commission (NEC) to invite and assemble the 76-strong international election observation (IEO) team for the September 2005 elections for the House of Representatives[8]. In addition to the IEOs selected from four continents, there were Somalilanders from the diaspora in the UK, Sweden and Canada, and expatriate staff of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs)[9]. After sending a preliminary assessment team to consult widely with local civil society, political parties, media, the NEC etc, CIIR fielded a team to observe the preparations for the poll, the parties’ campaigns, the aftermath of the poll, and to monitor media coverage. The elections were witnessed by a team of 76 observers from 19 countries - Kenya, Ethiopia, South Africa, Mozambique, the Philippines, Germany, France, Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria, Italy, Denmark, Spain, Finland, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

Since the European Commission (EC) could not provide funds directly to the NEC or government institutions, there was a need for an intermediary international organisation, able to submit a project proposal based on the “Somali Democracy Programme”, Phase One of which addressed the Somaliland parliamentary elections in Sept 2005. WSP matched the criteria as they have affiliates in Somalia/Somaliland such as the Academy of Peace & Development (APD). The WSP and the APD had management roles as well as financial responsibility.

A week prior to the poll, the peaceful election campaign was interrupted by a serious security incident in Hargeisa, involving a gun battle between police and a group of alleged militant jihadists linked to a Mogadishu Islamic radical groups. This appeared a double purpose attack; firstly to disrupt elections, and secondly, to free prisoners awaiting trial for the murders of foreigners in Somaliland. Several of those detained by police have since been convicted of the murders, and sentenced to death[10].

The elections themselves and the observation mission were not affected, and the IEOs went on to visit 361 polling stations around Somaliland on the polling day itself (over-one third of the total of 982 stations) and found the atmosphere highly positive. Election day saw a turnout of over 600,000 voters. The IEOs were able to conclude that despite many procedural problems as with the 2002 elections (lack of a census and registration process; breaking of the voluntary code of conduct by political parties; a lack of secrecy in some ballots; complicated ballot papers; attempts at multiple voting; and unequal representation of women) the elections were conducted in a ‘reasonably free and fair’ fashion.[11] Within days of the poll, but before the final results were confirmed, CIIR issued an interim report in October to this effect to the NEC. We noted in our final report that in contrast to neighbouring countries like Ethiopia, the elections were carried out peacefully - yet again. The diaspora played a visible role and contributed extensive experience of other democratisation processes. The parties, although combative and unequally privileged, were disciplined. We made recommendations to the NEC, the international donor community, political parties and to Somaliland civil society including donor support to make the NEC a permanent body. We also noted that we were about to see the working out of a situation unique in Africa of a government without a numerical majority in parliament: perhaps another example – such as the hybrid system - of Somaliland providing lessons to the rest of Africa?

Whilst we believed and declared the elections to be ‘reasonably free and fair’ (given the prioritising in the polling process of transparency above secrecy), we were keen to stress throughout, given our work with local NGOs in such areas as capacity building, that this was just the beginning of the democratisation process. Somalilanders themselves addressed some of these problems in a series of regional and national workshops.

Post-election challenges
Economically there is drought and vulnerability of pastoral communities, with the loss of sales of livestock as a result of the Saudi export ban. Somaliland is not in a position to drive hard bargains from outsiders wishing to exploit natural resources etc. Lack of investment, apart from that emanating from the diaspora, can be linked to the lack of recognition which means would-be investors are worried by the lack of insurance, concerned whether financial institutions are reliable etc. Socially there is the qat chewing issue – which has social, environmental, gender as well as productivity implications. In terms of gender, Somaliland has patriarchal structures and practices; this is despite the existence of highly educated women with their involvement in political, civil society and business matters. Terrorism is an internal as well as an external matter. Somaliland blamed the jihadists attack just before the September 2005 elections on organised terrorist groups in Mogadishu, recruiting people from Somaliland and paid warlords militias. It must also be faced as an internal problem linked to wider international concerns

In the electoral/ democratisation/ political domain which is the one we concentrate on, there have been worries over human rights, an independent judiciary and the continued existence of emergency law plus creeping corruption and an increasing investment in internal security. The security mindset of the Siad Barre era and the continuation of certain personnel means that the necessity of following formal legal process (rather than arbitrary political action) is perhaps still not understood by all ministers and parts of the government who have, in the past, appeared surprised at objections to its practice, e.g. over the expulsion of EU delegate Ahmed Washington in 2005 and Roland Marechal[12].

In terms of a functioning parliament, the picture has been mixed with a somewhat turbulent start as the parties negotiated their relationship with each other and with the executive, helped by the consensus approach of the Guurti[13]. Subsequently there have been interesting pointers in matters of consensus, democratisation and nation building. There has been the formation of three subcommittees – which point to greater involvement in national affairs – justice and human rights, anti-corruption and environmental and rural communities. The majority of the MPs are new and while many of them are said to be better educated than their predecessors, they lack experience and are unfamiliar with the functions of parliament – although Interpeace has moved into Phase Two of the Democratisation Programme with a resource centre, parliamentary infrastructural improvement and IT training. The diaspora has also provided advice.

Achieving political consensus has been the cornerstone of stability in Somaliland, to the extent that uncomfortable compromises have been made at times. In the new parliament, the opposition is looking to form a coherent alliance and challenge the government on a number of fronts. The system of opposition parties having a parliamentary majority complicates matters such as collaboration between parliament and presidency, which has led to dispute on issues such as the increase of the Guurti term by four years. This was suggested by the President and approved by the Guurti and rejected by the lower house. The term of the Guurti ends in October 2006 with no solution in sight. Parliament is though, in the process of finalising the electoral law for Guurti elections, although these are not immediately likely. Despite this Somaliland has succeeded in reaching consensus on solving issues which could have been damaging to the country.

There has been surprising unanimity of all parties on occasion in relation to government. The two non-governing parties have been successful in exerting party discipline – picking a speaker and two deputies. Before that they had been seen as weak institutions showing little life outside election campaigns, with little internal democracy/ capacity/commitment to policy formulation. A major constraint has been resources. It is perhaps early days but we are yet to see signs of differentiation between the parties, or discern their internal dynamics as well as differentiated programmes and policies. How do they see coalition-building and internal discipline – in order to hold the executive to account? The opposition agenda, little of which has been yet achieved, includes revoking the emergency laws, reducing the size of the cabinet, transferring to Parliament a degree of effective power, reviewing the role and length of tenure of the Guurti, increasing fiscal accountability and transparency, reviewing media law, the security sector budget, decentralising government, examining the validity of a three-party system in a plural democracy[14].

There have been developments in the relationship between civil society groups, political parties and the government. Women’s groups and civil society groups have been waiting for Parliament to organise itself in order to lobby it, but are hopeful of a good working relationship: not least because several former civil society activists are MPs. Given that this was the first parliamentary election in 36 years (and the first time women were democratically elected to any Somali parliament) Somaliland has some claim in the progress of women’s representation. The lack of (but paradoxically growing) female representation and the wider political and economic participation overall have led to demands for an increase in set quotas/reserved seats for women in parliament. A Kulmiye woman MP who managed to campaign in Awdal region challenging men and clannism, has begun to focus on advocating for women’s issues in parliament. According to NAGAAD, the only chance for Somali women to have more MPs is through a quota system, meaning hard work by women activists to gain a constitutional review. At present this is at the informal workshops stage, involving meetings of CSOs, MPs and Guurti members with more men seeming to accept the idea. Parties will be under increasing pressure from women and civil society organisations to review their policies on female candidacy, ensuring that changes are made to structures, policies and personnel. Women in and out of parliament have called not only for affirmative action but also for exposure visits to learn from other African countries experience such as Uganda[15].

In electoral terms for the future, there needs to be the establishment of the new NEC as a sustainable and effective institution as the mandate of the current one expires. This could examine the problems of voter registration and census, essential both for holding elections and as part of the state-building process (by defining and counting citizens). It could also be part of the review of electoral law to consolidate and iron out contradictions in the existing legislation.

International support and role:
The international community, in particular the EU, has to date, shown its support for democratisation in Somaliland by funding the elections; following the elections, Somaliland received messages of congratulations from several countries and international bodies. Despite the lack of movement by the African Union, there is growing support for Somaliland with favourable indications from Riyale’s six nation tour of East Africa. But words alone will be insufficient. The institutions in place to sustain a democratic system in Somaliland need assistance. These include the NEC, parliament, the judiciary and the government itself. It will also be important for people in Somaliland to see the benefits of democracy, by investment in the country’s infrastructure and services and providing information on democratisation (not that Somaliland should accept or believe all of this uncritically). In the various Somali peace negotiations, the strategy of regional and international mediators was to park the issue of Somaliland, in order to protect the stability in the region. The international community should of course support a resolution to the crisis in the south, but in a multi-track way that does not hold Somaliland hostage to developments there. Obviously there is much to be done here with civil society initiatives that build on Somaliland’s consensual and peace-building approach – which space does not allow us to expand on here. Suffice it to say that we see the growing capacity of local NGOs in which we are involved as crucial in this.

A relationship of mutual respect between international and local NGOs is also key. There are, however, few international organisations working directly with women’s groups, human rights and research organisations, such as Hargeisa Womens Group Association (HAWO), Institute for Practical Research and Training in Somaliland (IPRT), Academy of Peace and Development, Nagaad Umbrella Organisation of Hargeisa Women NGOs, Samo-Talis, Womens Rehabilitation and Development Association (WORDA)[16].

The issue of diaspora funding is ambiguous. On the one hand it can be seen as providing both investment and good people-people initiatives and can be very productive (e.g. Amoud University). On the other hand it does not seem to nurture either a good relationship with the government or ensure that governments have to be accountable to tax payers as well as voters for policy etc. Similarly to Angola where there is 'a state without citizens' i.e. the government is entirely externally-oriented due to oil revenues, the Hargeisa government does not have to be accountable to its own citizens, if outsiders are relied upon for funding key elements of policy. We are not suggesting that the Angola case is directly comparable to Somaliland given the latter’s low tax base and very small revenue flows. However dependence on diaspora funding for much of the social services (hospitals, education – in fact most things bar security and the president's travel) mean the government does not concern itself with many elements that other governments do. Additionally many current and Egal era ministers and political party leaders have dual nationality and many Somalilanders joke that they ‘have a government in exile’ i.e. ministers (and political party leaders) etc spend more time soliciting support from the diaspora than working on policy at home or engaging with Somalilanders.

We suggest below some of the ways that civil society, diaspora and parliamentarians can bring about greater awareness of Somaliland’s achievements and help its push for democratisation (not to gainsay what is already happening).

Providing assistance to the emerging democratisation process. Areas might be the effective role of political parties, human rights training, media freedom issues, equality of gender representation etc. This needs a strong link to poverty reduction programmes.
Bringing awareness of the Somaliland peace-building approach.
Suggesting outside parliamentarians such as the UK APPG[17] liaise with their counterparts in selected African, European and other states to raise the profile of the case of Somaliland via parliamentary questions, briefings and encouraging their respective governments to encourage the development of a follow-up mechanism to the AU 2005 Fact-Finding report on Somaliland. Focusing pressure on states that are members of the AU's Peace and Security Council. Lobbying for joint investment opportunities in Somaliland.
Lobbying including via the G8 to provide grants for road infrastructure, expanding Berbera port, schools and clinics, as part of the Gleneagles agreement to provide poor countries with grants.
Engaging with the Nepad secretariat to look into post-conflict infrastructural development.
Seeking greater coordination between the various Somalilander organisations and support organisations abroad – and indeed Somali ones for people-people cooperation. Being aware of the dangers of dependency, whilst seeking greater coordination.
Lobbying on overcoming the Rift Valley Fever ban on livestock exports to Saudi Arabia.
Helping make the case that Somaliland is an existing fact and a coherent political entity. Drawing the parallels with what is happening in South Sudan and pursuing the agenda that the International Crisis Group (ICG) has put forward of e.g. an observer role for Somaliland in AU forums.

Conclusion
How best do outsiders, however sympathetic, concentrate on the issues we outline here of democratisation and development and perhaps more immediate questions facing people, parliament and government? Having staged three elections, the commitment of the Somaliland people and the political elite to a democratic form of politics cannot easily be questioned or ignored. To do so would make a mockery of the West’s commitment to support democracy. To ignore what has been achieved in a democratic Islamic country would also send the wrong message to Somalia and to countries in the region and the Middle East.

Most importantly let us not reinvent a process that has no purchase in Somaliland or indeed in Somalia. What we should look at is the way that the people of Somaliland brought peace through indigenous and understood forms – mechanisms of dialogue, clan structures, elders (and women’s input even if only behind the scenes?). In a sense this paper is an unfinished chapter in a wider story about how the mix of traditional and understood structures change, at what speed, and who controls and wants to control the process. The government is in the paradoxical position of having had to go its own way given the lack of international recognition, but its poverty and lack of resources means that it is in fact very dependent on the outside – both in terms of economic support and how the outside community views events in (wider) Somalia. Creative engagement on sensitively overcoming such dependence between those living in Somaliland including the government and those outside (diaspora or friends) will remain key for many years.


[1] Known before 2006 as the Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR), with its skillshare programme known in some countries, including Somaliland, as International Cooperation for Development (ICD). Dr. Steve Kibble is the advocacy coordinator for Africa/ Yemen and Dr. Adan Abokor is the country representative for Somaliland. Progressio as CIIR acted as joint coordinator for the international election observers in September/ October 2005. It has played a role in the setting up of Somaliland Focus (UK) and the UK All-Party Parliamentary Group on Somaliland (APPG).
[2] Members of the diaspora with dual nationalities have played an important role. They left their homeland as adults being familiar with traditional systems to engage with the democratic systems in the North.
[3] There is much debate on how relevant the term civil society is for countries like Somaliland, notably from commentators such as Ioan Lewis.
[4] Although we should not underestimate in this hybrid system the role of Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, the founder of UDUB, in the multi-party system/democratisation process in Somaliland, but stemming from his experience as an ‘old guard’ in Somali politics.
[5] There is uncertainty following the African Union fact-finding mission which declared in 2005 that Somaliland's status was "unique and self-justified in African political history," and that "the case should not be linked to the notion of 'opening a Pandora's box.' However a decision was put off under Arab pressure at the summit meeting of African Union heads of state meeting in July 2006 in Banjul.
[6] The assassination of Yahye, the head of a peace research organisation affiliated with the War Torn Societies Project (WSP now Interpeace) is greatly concerning in this context.
[7] Abokor, Bradbury, Kibble etc ‘Very much a Somaliland-run election’: Report of the Somaliland local elections. 2003. CIIR. www.progressio.org.uk
[8] We coordinated other teams, but were only responsible for choosing our own election team personnel. Other teams released their own report on the elections as well e.g. the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa.
[9] Abokor and Kibble (2006) ibid
[10] A complicating factor is that Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, chairperson of the Islamic Courts in Mogadishu and previously one of the leaders of A-Itihad Al-Islamiya, a militant group involved in violent acts in Ethiopia and Somalia/Somaliland was among 15 defendants (seven including Sheikh Aweys in absentia) being tried for this attack.
[11] International Election Observation team interim report on the Somaliland elections to the House of Representatives 29 September 2005, issued 7 October 2005, available at www.progressio.org.uk. The findings and recommendations of the interim report were incorporated in the final report.
[12] Compounded some would say by lack of Presidential control over some ministers,their calibre and the oversized cabinet which the recent reshuffle did not address. This is with the exception of the new Minister of Planning who is a retired senior officer of the ILO and highly respected personality, which gave the international agencies working in Somaliland great relief.
[13] One might omit from this assertion the latter’s recent desire to hang on to their positions.
[14] The three parties emerged arose from the leading political groupings in the 2002 local elections as a mechanism to ensure that parties did not represent single clans and had broad-based support across regions – although clan as ever is the unstated invisible fact of Somaliland politics.
[15] See the expected paper to this convention on this.
[16] National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and Progressio undertake much of this work.
[17] Briefing to the APPG by Somaliland Focus (UK) 28th June 2006 available from SF(UK) website.

http://samotalis.blogspot.com/

‘Somaliland: The Post Election Path’

Progressio/ Somaliland Focus (UK)
House of Commons 10th January 2006
Input and report launch by Dr Steve Kibble, advocacy coordinator for Africa and Yemen, Progressio

Thanks chair. I am very pleased to be here to launch this report with many friends of Somaliland, Somalilanders including the leader of the opposition, Ahmed Siilanyo, the Mayor of Sanaag, MPs and UK parliamentarians. I am sorry to hear about the father of our other speaker – UK minister for development, Gareth Thomas.

Thanks to our hosts from the House (Tony Baldry and Alun Michael) who have shown a long-term commitment to Somaliland and Somalia. I should also like to welcome fellow members: our joint hosts Somaliland Focus (UK) (many of them IEOs) and indeed the Anglo-Somali Society. I am also happy that our South African IEO friends in the delegation sent a message of support. I also welcome colleagues at Progressio, possibly better known to you under its former name the Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR), and the publisher of this report that we are launching tonight in London and at some point soon in Hargeisa. So, after more thanks than an Oscar winner I should just say that my remarks are personal ones and are not intended to merely replicate the report. It is humbling to be invited to speak before so many Somalilanders who know far more than I and I hope my remarks can be seen as those of an outside friend keen to push along debates on the major issues facing their country.

Introduction
As we know, Somaliland has been building systems of legitimate and accountable governance with some form of social contract with its people and/or civil society – a term we might dispute in relation to Somaliland but let us use for the time being. The proclamation of independence in 1991 meant that the new state had the opportunity to break with former corrupt, military and unrepresentative forms of government. While the lack of international recognition meant a lack of governing support granted to many post-conflict countries, it did give Somalilanders the opportunity to build their own system tailored to their needs. For the first twelve years this was a hybrid system combining traditional institutions of clan governance (or male pastoral democracy) with formal Western-style government institutions. However, although rooted in popular consciousness, these institutions played a minimalist role. In May 1999, the Hargeisa government approved a plan to move from the current clan-based system to a multi-party political system –providing the proposed parties were not based on tribal or religious lines and drew support from all regions. There were to be votes for women, although no women were actually consulted in drawing up the draft. While Somaliland’s independence is contested externally and internally, the desire to be treated separately from Somalia – for the majority of people – is very real.

With the 2001 referendum, the local elections of 2002, the presidential elections of 2003 and – more recently – the parliamentary elections of 2005, we are still assessing the effects of these democratic gains and intentions against the background of clan, patriarchal and business interests as well as tensions emanating from political Islam.

As you may already know, Progressio/ CIIR/ ICD has been working in Somaliland since 1995. Internationally, this has involved advocating and lobbying for recognition of the country’s achievements in development and democratisation. Furthermore, Progressio has been engaged in the formation of Somaliland Focus (UK) – a group aimed at bringing greater awareness of Somaliland and its achievements to the attention of policy makers and a wider audience in general.

The parliamentary elections of September 2005
CIIR – as we were formerly known – sent a team of official election observers to observe the various referendums and elections. As officially requested by the National Electoral Commission (NEC), our greatest challenge was to invite and assemble the 76-strong international election observation (IEO) team for the September 2005 elections for the House of Representatives. In addition to the IEOs selected from across four continents, there were a number of Somalilanders from the diaspora and expatriate staff of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs). In all, this was a great experience.

In the report we pay tribute to the 800,000 Somaliland voters who – after spending hours walking to the polling station – queued for six hours in the heat to vote. Despite some major logistical issues, the NEC ran a successful election (with the help of some experienced consultants). We had both constructive dialogue and a couple of standoffs with the NEC but it all came right in the end. International NGOs loaned vehicles and radios, without which our mission would not have been possible. We visited over a third of the 900 polling stations and found the atmosphere highly positive. As with the 2002 elections, there were problems that we outlined in our interim report to the NEC of October 2005 and in this report. Some of the problems in question related to the lack of a census and hence a registration process; a largely illiterate population; very complicated ballot papers with symbols for all candidates (transparency being rated more highly than secrecy of the ballot); Sanaag and Sool security constraints; governing party use of money, vehicles, fuel, and airtime and attempted multiple voting. The major concern of IEOs and those Somalilanders with whom we work with was the very unequal, but we hope improving, representation of women.

In contrast to neighbouring countries like Ethiopia, the elections were carried out peacefully yet again. The diaspora played a visible role and contributed extensive experience of other democratisation processes. The parties, although combative and unequally privileged, were disciplined. We have made recommendations to the NEC, the international donor community, political parties and to Somaliland civil society.

We now await the working out of a situation unique in Africa of a government without a numerical majority in parliament: perhaps another example – such as the hybrid system of Somaliland – providing lessons to the rest of Africa.

Whilst we believed and declared the elections ‘reasonably free and fair’, we were keen to stress throughout that this was just the beginning of the democratisation process and, in many ways, its most difficult phase. What is the way forward and what are the challenges facing Somalianders? How can the rest of us help build on these positive steps and work with all Somalilanders to overcome their problems?

In order to answer this we have to ask: where is Somaliland?
1) Background
As well as running three peaceful elections, the government has signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; overseen the restoration of peace; demobilised former combatants; brought about social and economic rehabilitation and overseen the drafting of a constitution based on universal suffrage, decentralisation and multi‑partyism. There is a war crimes commission looking into the human rights abuses of the Siad Barre years. There is a reasonably high level of personal security for citizens. The background is about the kind of transition we are looking at. Do we know and can we agree on from and where we are moving? (On a previous occasion at SOAS in November last year, I asked a historical question posed by Mark Bradbury: whether Somaliland or the region had yet completely come to terms with the way that a decentralised [for men] egalitarian clan-based system had come into unequal contact with a modernist centralised colonial system. Mark Bradbury points to the three historical eras that followed this collision – all marked by violence. Is the inheritance yet overcome?)

2) The practice of government
This government has been participatory in so far as structures for consultation and consensus do exist, but is it yet democratic in its practice? (A key question to ask anywhere, given the lack of a parliamentary vote we have here in the UK on small matters like going to war.)

As everywhere, the government needs to demonstrate its respect for civil liberties, human rights standards and the rule of law. Since 2002, Somaliland’s reputation for this has been called into question by some high profile legal cases, creeping corruption and an increasing investment in internal security. Immediately following the elections, the government once again demonstrated its intolerance of perceived ‘enemies’ by declaring the European Union delegate to Somaliland Ahmed Washington, persona non grata. The security mindset of the Siad Barre era and the continuation of certain personnel) means that that acceptance of formal legal process (rather than arbitrary political action is perhaps still not understood by all ministers and parts of the government who have, in the past, appeared surprised at objections to its practice. The same applies to the relationship with the media. As we said at SOAS in November, such arbitrary action will not win Somaliland foreign friends.





3) A functional parliament
The regularisation of political representation in parliament should, in theory, provide support in resolving conflict peacefully and avoid a return to the instability that has plagued Somaliland and Southern Somalia. A measure of Somaliland’s democracy will be the way in which its elected institutions function and are utilised by the parties and the public alike. The first few months of the new parliament started off turbulently as its members and the parties negotiated their relationship with one other and with the executive. The majority of the MPs are new and while many of them will be better educated than their predecessors, they lack experience and are unfamiliar with the functions of parliament – although we know that the diaspora here has been providing information. Achieving political consensus has been the cornerstone of stability in Somaliland, to the extent that uncomfortable compromises have been made at times. In the new parliament, the opposition is looking to form an alliance and challenge the government from a number of fronts.

4) Political parties
The two non-governing parties have been successful in exerting party discipline – picking a speaker and two deputies. Before that they had been seen as weak institutions showing little life outside election campaigns, with little internal democracy capacity/commitment to policy formulation. The parties’ links with and control over members elected in their name to the district councils has been tenuous. The regional structures that existed disappeared once the parliamentary election campaign got going. The parties operated as united political forces in the presidential election, with funding and campaigning centralised. A major constraint facing the parties has been to do with resources. In the parliamentary election they received only a limited amount of public funding from the government for core salary costs – relying on the patronage of clan and businesses. The leaders of the parties did not themselves stand in the election and they are likely to find it difficult to enforce adherence to the party or its policies among their MPs. For the candidates, the parties were a legal mechanism for entering parliament. The sitting MPs may seek to reform the parties by insisting that they become members of the parties’ executive committees. Some may decide to join other parties. One of the few forms of leverage that the parties have over their MPs is for the party to refuse to re-nominate a candidate who does not tow the party line.

Do we yet see signs of differentiations between themselves, their internal dynamics as well as programmes and policies? How do they see coalition-building and internal discipline – holding the executive to account?

5) The opposition agenda for parliament is enormous and includes:
· Revoking the emergency laws – a review of the constitution to curb the powers of the executive, to review the size of parliament, and to review the restrictions on political parties. This might include a proposal to create a post of prime minister.

· Impeach the president. Although openly discussed in the elections, opposition party leaders have cooled this fervour. There may be a push for early presidential elections, although this is likely to be rejected on grounds of cost.

· Measures to reduce the size of the cabinet from 50 to between 12 or 18 ministers. It is likely that parliament will exercise its powers to reject cabinet appointments and may push for the removal of certain unpopular ministers.

· Measures to increase fiscal accountability and transparency in the executive through greater control and oversight over the national budget, a review of foreign investment contracts, a review of fishing concessions, a review of the management of Berbera port and the establishment of a commission to tackle corruption.

· Measures to open up and stimulate the economy, including plans for the leasing of Berbera port.

· A review of the media law.

· An open debate on Somaliland’s relationship with Somalia and the status of the contested eastern regions.

· A review of the security sector budget, with the aim of cutting it and putting more resources into social services.

· Voter registration and census – seen both as essential for holding elections and as part of the state-building process (by defining and counting citizens).

· A review of electoral law – to consolidate and iron out contradictions in the existing legislation.

· Strengthen local government laws for the decentralisation of government.

· A review of the role of the Guurti and its appointment.

· Renewal of the mandate of the NEC (which has another year on its mandate).


6) Debate continues in Somaliland on the validity of a three-party system in a plural democracy.
Some argue that the restricted system is a sensible solution to clan-based politics, preventing social cleavages or parties becoming a reflection of the clan. Others argue that the restriction on the number of parties is a direct contradiction of the right to free association. The constitution also effectively gives the parties eternal life. While the parties are unlikely to push for a change, there is likely to be popular pressure to review the restriction and allow for an increased number of parties or a mechanism that would enable the de-selection of a party that fails to deliver.

7) Traditional structures
The role of the traditional structures – notably the house of elders or Guurti –has been highly visible and effective in terms of stability and reconciliation since independence. This, however, remains an unelected legislative institution.

Its mandate is due to expire in 2006 and a decision will need to be made as to whether it should become an elected chamber or remain an appointed one. As people in Somaliland experiment with democratic multi-party politics, they will be challenged to maintain and incorporate the positive attributes of a pastoral democracy within the system of government (namely consensus building, mediation and arbitration) whilst minimising its more negative influences. The question is: can the Guurti continue to do this?

Although the chamber has been criticised for becoming too institutionalised and reliant on government to be able to act as the objective mediator in Somaliland’s national politics, it remains a unique institution that has been at the heart of clan-based, power-sharing and consensual politics in Somaliland – linking modern political institutions to traditional political organisation and, by extension, inter-communal politics to national politics. The public recognises the role it played in mobilising the population in the war against Siyad Barre and in shepherding Somaliland through the minefields of post-war politics and state-building. There are numerous sources of legitimacy and authority in societies and although the authority of the Guurti is not based on a popular vote, it is no less legitimate for that.

Indeed, there appears to be a general consensus among the parties, the NEC and the public that the Guurti should remain a nominated body, and the country cannot afford another election. The Guurti can be a place where imbalances in political representation as a result of elections are restored, with seats being made available for minority clans and possibly women. Meanwhile, following the 2005 elections, the Guurti has certainly shown that it has had an important role to play in assisting the new parliament to settle in and be a reconciling force.

8) Civil society
The development in the relationship between civil society groups, political parties and the government will be another challenge. How do the people of Somaliland ensure that their voice is heard and responded to? Civil society is busy organising itself in terms of gender representation, provision of social services, budget-tracking and human rights practice. How will political parties and government respond to this? Although parliament includes several MPs who were formerly active in civil society, it remains to be seen whether it proves to be more amenable to external advocacy or will actively seek opinion from civil society groups.


9) Women
Given that this was the first parliamentary election in 36 years (and the first time women were democratically elected to a Somali parliament) Somaliland has some claim in the progress of women’s representation. The lack of (but paradoxically growing) female representation and the wider political and economic participation overall have led to demands for an increase in set quotas/reserved seats for women in parliament. The parties will also be under pressure from women and civil society organisations to review their policies on female candidacy, ensuring that changes are made to structures, policies and political agendas that will affirm the participation of women (and other minorities) in politics. IEOs had discussions in Somaliland as to whether or not women could be represented in the upper house/Guurti. The chair indicated it was a possibility that would strengthen the position of women ‘further down’.

10) South Somalia and region
It was also apparent that the process in Somaliland has had exemplary (if unintended) consequences in Mogadishu and Puntland and may be a useful lesson for the region and its people pushing for a voice in their governance. Again, we can mention Ethiopia. The presence of an Arab League election observer was also seen as significant. We are still evaluating the significance, in November 2005, of Somali Prime Minister Mohamed Geedi’s statement that they would go along with – but not initiate – recognition and the subsequent furore and withdrawal of that statement. Politicians, like foreign footballers and rock stars, can always claim to have been misquoted or had remarks taken out of context. The parliamentary election serves to reinforce the contrast between Somaliland’s elected administration and the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia, which is struggling (amongst other problems) to sustain a semblance of parliamentary consensus. Reactions by people in Somalia to the parliamentary election in Somaliland were mixed. Somaliland received messages of support from southern civil society groups after the election.

11) Recognition and democratisation
The recognition issue is a key litmus test for Somalilanders and one that many are keen to push. In 1999, President Egal argued that democratisation would facilitate international recognition of Somaliland. However, while the parties campaigned on a pro-independence platform and many voters themselves saw voting as a patriotic act, these elections were not put on for external purposes. They were about changing the internal balance of power. Nevertheless, the parliamentary election was also another step in building an independent state and it has implications for the status of Somaliland and its relationship with Somalia. But perhaps there are more immediate questions facing people in government concerning democratisation and development. We are aware that success here may bring recognition closer or strengthen the case for it, but perhaps as a by-product. Is the democratisation process an inherent part of the recognition process or can/should we delink them? Perhaps the democratisation process was initially seen as part of the fight for recognition but has developed a life and an unstoppable momentum of its own.

12) What steps need to be taken to ensure an independent and trained judiciary?

13) Terrorism – 2 aspects.
Somaliland blamed the jihadists on Mogadishu. But we know that Somalilanders were involved and talk of brainwashing, criminal warlord gangs etc, is indeed to touch on part of the problem. But it must also be faced as an internal problem linked to wider international concerns – Iraq, Abu Ghraib, Israel/Palestine etc. The reasons for, and manifestations of, terrorism have to be dealt with. Somaliland is not alone in this; given that tube trains and a number 30 bus were blown up very close to here last summer by people from my own city. How can Somaliland make use of the US war on terror? According to Ioan Lewis the latter should consider moving from striking deals with individual warlords to investigating the stable conditions provided by a functioning state in terms of predictable anti-terrorist cooperation. He asks: 'what better partner than Somaliland?'

14) International support and role:
How best do outsiders, however sympathetic, concentrate on the issues of democratisation and development and perhaps more immediate questions facing people, parliament and government? We are aware that success here may bring recognition closer or strengthen the case for it, but without making recognition the key part of their solidarity work – not just because of charity laws or whatever - but because it may, in fact, be counter-productive (Africanise not Europeanise).

Having staged three elections, the commitment of the Somaliland people and the political elite to a democratic form of politics cannot easily be questioned or ignored. To do so would make a mockery of the West’s commitment to support democracy. As one parliamentary candidate remarked: something is wrong. In Somalia you just need to kill 100 people to be recognised by the international community as a player. But you do not get any recognition if several thousand people vote for you here. A lack of support for democratic Somaliland would not go unnoticed in neighbouring countries. And to ignore what has been achieved in a democratic Islamic country would also send the wrong message to Somalia and to countries in the region and the Middle East.

The international community has, to date, shown its support for democratisation in Somaliland by funding the elections. And following the elections, Somaliland received messages of congratulations from several countries and international bodies. These include the Arab League, whose representative visited Hargeisa in October 2005, and the US Government, which issued a press release from the State Department that made favourable reference to the poll. The United Nations through the Secretary General's Special Representative for Somalia, Ambassador Francoise Lonseny Fall, commended people in Somaliland for the progress they have made towards security and democracy.

Moves by the African Union – discreetly helped along by South Africa earlier in 2005 to investigate Somaliland’s claim for independence – indicate that other African governments are not averse to giving this serious consideration. In the meantime, the message from the elections is that people in Somaliland are getting on with building a state and hope that the international community will accept and support them in this. Regionally, in Mogadishu, there was little mainstream criticism of the elections and several LNGOs spoke out in support of the process. There was also considerable interest in Kenya. The recent visit of UN Secretary-General’s special rep Francois Lonseny Fell saw a promise that he would take back to Kofi Annan the pungently expressed view of President Riyale that the UN was holding the people of Somaliland hostage through lack of recognition. In fact Somaliland was seemingly not then discussed, although Somalia and the arms embargo was.

But words alone will be insufficient. The institutions in place to sustain a democratic system in Somaliland need assistance. These include the NEC, parliament, the judiciary and the government itself. It will also be important for people in Somaliland to see the benefits of democracy, by investment in the country’s infrastructure and services and providing information on democratisation (not that Somaliland should accept or believe this uncritically).

In the Somali National Peace Conference in Mbgathi, the strategy of regional and international mediators was to park the issue of Somaliland, in order to protect the stability in that region. The message from Somaliland’s leadership is that the international community should of course support a resolution to the crisis in the south, but in a way that does not hold Somaliland hostage to developments there.

Recently civil society, the media and NEC were engaged in discussion with a major donor. They pointed to a number of key areas, including support for the creation of a strong link between the newly elected MPs, CSOs and Media. This will help the MPs to understand the issues and policies that need to be addressed, in other words awareness raising for the new MPs. Establishment of the new NEC as a sustainable and effective institution after the five years of the current NEC expires.

For women in parliament: affirmative actions and exposure visits to learn from other cases in Uganda and elsewhere. Training the new MPs: second phase of the Somali Democratisation Project.

There need to be more such discussions, of course.

Since our report what has happened and what are the trends we can deduce?

In a sense not a lot has happened since the elections, but there are interesting pointers in matters of consensus, democratisation and nation building. It seems as though there was, after the intervention of the Guurti, recognition by government and others that they could not continue in the old way and just expect Parliament to fall into line in some kind of Cromwellian way. The President’s statement after the crisis was resolved that it was ‘a blessing in disguise’ backed up by his invitation to Parliament to work together for the good of the nation. Tributes from opposition leaders that this showed maturity were also encouraging (although you can't get too cosy).

For the moment attention is still focused on what is happening in the new Parliament. Internal regulations (by-laws) have not been very clear and have seemed in contradiction to the constitution – in part making the November crisis inevitable, perhaps. Furthermore, there has been the formation of three new subcommittees – which point to greater involvement in national affairs – justice and human rights, anti-corruption and environmental and rural communities. Whilst these are being finalised and while the President was out of the country seeking oil agreements in Norway and better health in Germany, it seems as though December was quiet. Parliament has been awaiting the submission of a new government budget and will no doubt be dying to show its mettle when it gets in, even if the amount is likely to be small.

Women’s groups and civil society groups are waiting on Parliament to sort itself out and then engage with them but are hopeful of a good working relationship: not least because of several former civil society activists now being MPs.

We still await resolution of a major issue. At the first public meeting of the newly formed Somaliland Focus (UK) we pointed out that the declaring of EU delegate Ahmed Washington made it difficult for those working outside the country to promote the case for Somaliland’s democratisation process. Since then the President has agreed that Ahmed should return. This is slightly complicated by the fact that he was on the point of being replaced anyway. A further complication is that the Minister of Planning said in a press conference that the PNG decision was not going to be reversed. We await clarity on this and also look to the rule of constitutional law and parliamentary supervision reigning in these matters rather than executive dictat.

It also seems as though parliamentarians are developing a taste for checking the over-mighty powers of the security people. MPs investigating the treatment of demonstrators by the Hargeisa police were themselves physically abused, and as representatives of the people are investigating the way that the police consider themselves above the law.

What happened in Parliament in November shows the key role in consensus played by the most traditional institution: the Guurti. A key Somaliland journalist involved in our report said: ‘The value of traditional wisdom in resolving conflicts was again demonstrated as a determinant factor in this process. When asked by the chairman of the Council of Elders as to why they did not leave this issue for the Supreme Court to decide, his answer was direct, instant and comprehensive: “The decision of the Supreme Court will be final and they consider the issue from the legal point of view. This means there is always a possibility that one party may appear dissatisfied, but ours will be a compromising one and consensus based, considering the issue from the perspective of the supreme interests of the nation”.

The role of the Council of Elders in Somaliland has always been done through the typical African traditional mechanism of conflict management on which a rich culture of reconciliation, concession and consensus was built. How does transformation of this institution occur with the changing Somaliland polity? Adam Jibril Musse says that the high awareness of the Somaliland people, on the grass-root level, provided the method of resolving and solving conflict. How much do we want to lose that strength? Incremental change?

Conclusion
In a sense this is a wider story about how the mix of traditional and understood structures change, at what speed, and who controls and wants to control the process. Given the mix of clan system and autocracy the government’s authority is weak and dependent on its management of clan relations and the patronage of Somaliland’s big businessmen.

Although the report mentions how the election reflected the shifting balances of power within, and between, clans I leave this element to questions and to those more knowledgeable in the audience. I would merely ask: ‘Is the clan system the big problem? What is the future here given that it, along with religion, is a force for stability when there are few safety nets? Is the clan system capable of adaptive change and opening out, including letting women into the closed world? Economic development is often said to be the key – currently the clan is the support system – and the government is not capable yet of really supporting society. Until that begins to change, a move in politics away from clan lines is impossible.

Finally – in response to the question I recycled from Mark Bradbury – one can see the declaration of Somaliland independence within the second wave of democratisation in the early 1990s; arguably it had more success in legitimating the state in the eyes of its citizens at least because it was based on well understood and historically strong foundations that neither colonialism nor scientific socialism were able to wipe out – in essence a social contract which regulates political and economic relationships between pastoral kinship groups rather than delegating responsibility to a central government Somaliland’s recent history of conflict resolution has involved a bottom-up approach to building societies from local communities upwards, gradually widening the arena of political agreement and political consensus. According again to Ioan Lewis, this method of widening political consensus works when societies are as in the Somali case, highly fragmented and decentralised, and do not conform to assumptions about the universality of civil society and Western multiparty democracy.

How does this fit with the ideas emanating from civil society often influenced by time spent in the diaspora on other (more Western) forms of democratisation? Who negotiates this exchange? It seems as though some of the key actors are beginning to move the hybrid form along to reflect more clearly the developing Somaliland – women’s groups, civil society, urban youth, some of the business sector. How the more traditional elements exemplified perhaps by the ruling party UDUB and a number of clan leaders react to such movement will in reality reflect the Somaliland post-election path. However we should also be aware that this unlikely to be a linear path or ideed binary opposition between ‘so-called progress’ and ‘tradition’ particularly given what has been said about the Guurti and their place in consensus and reconciliation.

As my colleague in Hargeisa puts it – the curtain is down on the first act and we await with interest the second. I commend our report to you.

Thank you.
Steve Kibble
10 January 2006

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